[EM] FBC, center squeeze, and CD

[Michael Ossipoff]

Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that matter. I guess we have to reluctantly
give up Conditional Bucklin.

But it would have been strategically great!

Now, here's a question on a related topic:

Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I arrive X is winning. I
show up & plump for X, and that causes X to lose.


...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking, and that causes X to
lose?

If so, why?

It seems to me that the latter is worse than the former.

I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two things: I'm adding a
ballot, and I'm voting that ballot in a way that clearly should favor X.

If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived and plumped for X,
that made X lose??!"

...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, thereby
spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the fact that you voted for
X. You could have plumped for any of various candidates, and the effect
would have been exacsly the same."

But you can't say anything like to to explain why X lost when I raised hir
in my ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set more favorable to X
is the _only_ thing that I'm doing.

So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump.

Michael Ossipoff



On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> The example I just posted of  "IBIFA with an anti-defection device"
> failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both Mike's suggested
> "Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested "TopMiddleBottom".
>
> 20: F=C >>B
> 07: F > C=B   (or, for the sake of Forest's method suggestion, F >> C=B)
> 25: B
> 48: W
>
> All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C >> B voters change
> their rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom
> then the winner changes to B.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> On 11/6/2016 12:10 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Hi Forest--
>
> By "vote-receiving", I just wanted that to refer to the candidate who's
> being considered for receiving the conditional vote.
>
> Jameson has just demonstrated that my Conditional Approval fails FBC.
>
> Most likely, that means that my Conditional(u) Bucklin fails FBC too.
>
> Now, hopefully your proposal, &/or Chris's Unconditional Bucklin passes
> FBC.
>
> I've just now found your posting. I hope that your method or Chris's meets
> FBC.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 5, 2016 at 6:56 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>> Because it's so brief, let me state the conditional(u) option, for
>>> Approval, and for Bucklin:
>>>
>>> Approval:
>>>
>>> If a ballot conditionally approves a candidate, then it gives an approval
>>> to that candidate only if that vote-receiving candidate has more
>>> unconditional approvals than does any candidate unconditionally approved
>>> by
>>> that ballot.
>>>
>>>
>> I don't see the purpose of the qualifier "vote-receiving;" It seems to me
>> that if a candidate has more (unconditional) approvals than some other
>> candidate, then it is ipso facto "vote-receiving."
>>
>>
>> It could also be called TopMiddleBottom.
>>
>> Voters mark candidates Top, Middle, or Bottom., with default Bottom.
>>
>> In the first round count, ballots contribute support only to their Top
>> rated candidates. Then if (on some ballot) a Middle rated candidate has a
>> better chance of winning (according to the first round totals) than any
>> candidate that is Top rated by that ballot, then that ballot promotes that
>> candidate to Top status for the purposes of the final count.
>>
>> In other words, the Middle mark is a fall-back or conditional approval
>> mark.
>>
>>
>> ----
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>> info
>>
>>
>
>
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