[EM] Anti-defection strategy device for IBIFA

[Michael Ossipoff]

Yes, it's certain that Conditional Bucklin should allow the conditional
option in the 1st rank position (in addition to in all the other ranks).
...and, at that 1st rank, the determination whether to give the conditional
vote should use a comparison of the number of favorite-designations
received by the giving-ballot's favorite, and the receiving candidate.

...and that, from the 2nd rank on down, for any round, that determination
should be based on a comparison of the number of votes that those 2
candidates have received, as of just before that round.

Michael Ossipoff

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 6:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Sure, if full chicken-dilemma prevention could seriously jeopardize the
> CWs, making it more difficult to elect hir, requiring more insincere
> strategy to elect hir, then that could outweigh the benefit of fully
> getting rid of chicken-dilemma.
>
> The chicken-dilemma won't be as common as a CWs. That's one reason why I
> don't let the chicken dilemma keep me from proposing ordinary Approval.
> Another reason is the Nash equilibrium that Forest mentioned, and the
> stronger position of the A voters if they're well-known to probably be more
> numerous than the B voters.
>
> The desirability of easily protecting the CWs is the reason why I like
> wv-strategy...& why I've been reluctant to give up Plain MMPO.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 5:28 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>> That's essentially what I'm doing with PAR and PAR-prime. But I think
>>>> that conditional approval, as stated, is not a good rule; it makes center
>>>> squeeze seriously worse.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Wait a minute:
>>>
>>> "Center-squeeze" was defined as the problem of protecting a CWs, when
>>> the CWs is the least favorite candidate.
>>>
>>> Then how does Conditional Approval worsen that problem?
>>>
>>> ...compared to ordinary Approval?
>>>
>>> You mean voters might apply the conditional option when approving the
>>> CWs?
>>>
>>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>
>>> No, that option is only for chicken-dilemma situations. The CWs isn't
>>> the "B" in the chicken-dilemma scenario. B in that scenario isn't CWs.
>>>
>>
>> I think voters will not always be sophisticated about strategy. They
>> might use the wrong strategy and cause a breakdown.
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> And avoiding the slippery slope isn't as good as completely avoiding the
>>> chicken-dilemma.
>>>
>>
>> I disagree; in fact, I think it's better. "Avoiding" the chicken dilemma
>> makes center squeeze worse; but avoiding the slippery slope does not.
>>
>
>
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