[EM] I'm liking PAR

[Jameson Quinn]

I made the electowiki page for PAR voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Prefer_Accept_Reject_voting>, and I'm
liking the system more and more. In the Tennessee voting example, Nashville
wins in a strong equilibrium; as far as I can recall, this is the only
non-Condorcet system where that's true.

Compared to MAS, it loses later-no-help, IIA (though it still has LIIA),
and summability (though it has two-pass O(N) summability). It may gain
majority voted Condorcet loser, though I don't yet have a proof for that.

In practice, I expect that it would be rare to have elections with other
than exactly 1 or 2 non-eliminated candidates. In such elections, this
system elects the voted pairwise winner of the non-eliminated candidates.
In fact, I can't think of a single realistic scenario where the most
obvious naive votes don't elect an existing CW, including nonmajority CWs.
In particular, it handles both CD and center squeeze using naive votes.
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