[EM] (3) Vote-wasting questions: Steve 3rd dialogue with Kristofe

[steve bosworth]

 Re: [EM] (3) Vote-wasting questions: Steve 3rd dialogue with Kristofer

  >
From: km_elmet at t-online.de

> Subject: Re: [EM] (2) Vote-wasting questions: Steve 2nd dialogue with
Kristofer

> To: stevebosworth at hotmail.com; election-methods at lists.electorama.com

> Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 01:16:23 +010

 

To
Kristofer and everyone:

 

S:    Sorry, given your most recent response to our
2nd dialogue, I must have failed to make my definition of “wasting
votes” clear.  Mistakenly, you still
believe that APR must waste some votes. 
Please let me try again.

In
our 2nd dialogue, you had asked me to respond to your suggestions
that APR would waste some votes regardless of which of the follow 2 candidate
might be elected in the following example:

 

K:
> K: > (End of definition.)

> 

> E.g. if the candidates are A, B, C, and D, and the ballots are

> 10: A

> 11: C>D

> 12: A>B>C>D

> and the election is for two seats,

  […]

 

S:  Now I want to more fully explain that In this
case, APR would elect A with a “weighted vote” of 22 votes in the legislative
assembly and C with a weighted vote of 11 votes in the assembly, i.e. no votes
wasted.   A would get 22 “weighted votes” because 11
citizens had ranked A over all the other candidates and 12 had ranked A over
each of the other candidates as specified, i.e. as a result of the 1st
count of all the first preferences, it would be discovered that A had received
a total of 22 and C a total of 11.  In
this way, no votes are “wasted” because each of the 33 citizens has both helped
to elect and added their one vote to the elected candidate’s “weighted vote”
each most prefers. 

 

In
my article, I only claim that ‘each citizen could guarantee
that her one vote will fully continue into the legislative assembly by
giving a ‘weighted vote’ to each elected representative exactly equal to the
number of citizens who had helped to elect him or her’ (Abstract).  If any vote is ‘wasted’ this would ‘result from the
citizen's choice, ignorance, or disability’ (page 4).

 

 I hope this more detailed explanation will
also help you make sense of the following exchanges between us in our 2nd
dialogue:

> 

K:>> then if the winners are A and B, 11 votes are wasted. 

>
11 votes are wasted when the winners are A and B because the C>D ballots

> rank neither A nor B above last, but every other ballot ranks either A

> or B above last.



S:
>Yes, but in contrast to APR, also the 12 that went to B rather than A would
qualitatively partly be wasted because these 12 citizens preferred their votes
to go to A.



K:>> if the winners are A and C, no votes are wasted;

 

S:
>Yes, provided that each has the APR weighed votes as explained above.



K: >> if the winners are A and D, no votes are wasted;

 

S:
>No, in addition to the above wastage, the 11 votes from citizens who
preferred C over D would not be quantitatively wasted but would be
qualitatively partly wasted;

 

K:>>
and 10 votes are wasted when the winners are B and C because the 10 A-only

> ballots rank every candidate but A last.



S:>
Yes, in this suggestion, the 10 from the citizens who preferred A over all the
other candidates would be entirely wasted (i.e. quantitatively and
qualitatively).  However, also the 12 who
preferred A over B>C>D would not be quantitatively wasted but would be
qualitatively partly wasted.

 

K:>>
Is that correct?

 

S:  >Yes, partly correct and incorrect as
explained above.

 

K:
>> I think I understand what you mean by not wasting votes now.

 

S:
No, but perhaps that is my fault.

 

K: >> From this point on, all my vote-wasting discussion will be of the
quantitative

> sort unless otherwise specified.

> 

> For something like

> 

> 10: A>B

> 11: C>B

> 12: D

> 

> and two seats, electing A and C wastes votes (12 of them to be exact),

> but electing B and D doesn't.

 

S:
No.  In this case, APR would elect C with
a “weighted vote” of 11 and D with a weighted vote of 12.  The 10 votes given to A would be wasted only
by ordinary IRV using “weighted votes”. 
APR would not waste these 10 because it gives each citizen who fails to
rank any candidate that is elected the option of requiring her 1st
choice but eliminated candidate to transfer her one vote to the elected
candidate who that eliminated candidate trusts most (e.g. see the Sample Secret
Ballot at the end of the article).  However, perhaps I have never sent you a copy
of my article that systematically explains APR: 
“Equal Voting Sustained”. 
Separately I will send it to you now and to anyone else who might
request it.  Perhaps together with the
above additional explanation, my APR proposal will be clearer?

 

Of
course, I will gladly respond to these or any of the other elements of your
last post to me that you may still believe are not solved by the above. 



I
look forward to your next reply.

Steve

 

  		 	   		  
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