[EM] The scales of measurment determine most effective elections.

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue Dec 20 02:19:23 PST 2016


On 12/20/2016 04:25 AM, C.Benham wrote:
> On 12/20/2016 5:04 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
> 
>> Strategic voting remains only a residual problem with STV. But it can
>> occur in real life elections where a very popular candidate can take
>> away most of the first preferences of an allied candidate, subjecting
>> the ally to possible premature exclusion.
> 
> But surely (in normal STV) the surpluses are distributed before there
> are any exclusions, so wouldn't the surplus votes of the "very popular"
> candidate save the "allied" candidate
> from exclusion?

It sounds like he's referring to Hylland free riding. Suppose candidate
B is close to the quota and A is above the quota. Then voting A>B may
fail to make B win, since after A gets elected, everybody who voted A
first will have their voting power reduced. Thus voting B gives more
power towards getting B elected if A is going to win anyway. The risk,
of course, lies in overestimating A's support; and in that if everybody
applies the strategy, the whole STV procedure may seem pointless because
the final counts become pretty much the same as the initial counts.


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