[EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

[robert bristow-johnson]

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Subject: Re: [EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>

Date: Thu, December 8, 2016 6:35 pm

To: "Daniel LaLiberte" <daniel.laliberte at gmail.com>

Cc: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

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> When I used the example of MDDA & MDDAsc, to illustrate that it's better to

> equal-top-rank your strong top-set, rather than choosing among them by

> ranking them in order of preference--That wasn't intended as criticism of

> MDDA & MDDAsc.

>

> The fact of it being better to equal-rank the set that is important to you

> instead of choosing among them is true with other rank methods too.

>

> In particular, it's true of Condorcet & Bucklin. It would be true of IRV

> too, if IRV allowed equal-ranking.
if IRV allowed equal-ranking, who of the equal-ranked 2nd choice are promoted to the 1st choice (because that's the only choice that gets counted in IRV) when the 1st choice is eliminated?  unless you split votes in half, there is no way to do it.
 and try selling the concept of a 1/2 vote to legislators or voters considering it?  in Burlington Vermont, the ballot instructions were clear that assigning the same rank to two candidates would spoil your ballot.
 
> I don't have proof that it's, in principle, a
property of _all_
> ranking-methods, but I don't know of an exception.
lemme see, you're claiming that, without an exception that you know of, in any ranked method it is an advisable strategy to equally rank all candidates that you "sorta like"?  you think voters that are free to unequally
rank them (but not to have to score them) would prefer to follow your tactical advise in their particular circumstances that you have no idea of?  you can discern that a voter's best political interest would be served by that?
and then you think it's little burden to the RCV voter to
actually grok that decision in the voting booth: "Lessee, I really like Andy over Bob, but I can live with either and since Michael Ossipoff recommends equally-ranking the top set, I'll rank Bob equal to Andy, just to make sure that this will more effectively defeat Curtis whom I don't want
elected?"
you think a voter would prefer that to simply ranking Andy > Bob > Curtis?
the main reason we want to use other systems than Plurality is to reduce the burden of tactical voting on voters and let them express their political interest with little worry about shooting
themselves in the foot and voter regret.  tactical voting is not pleasant.  and another reason is to reduce the effect of voting *strategy* by campaigns or interest groups trying to swing elections by persuading a quantity of voters to vote a certain way.
i don't see how this advice
is attractive to regular voters, who want to be heard, who don't want surprizes because of irregularities.  why would they be motivated to do that?  why would they be motivated to even try to remember such advice and its detail?



--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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