[EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

Tue Dec 6 12:37:26 PST 2016

On Sat, Dec 3, 2016 at 9:09 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Daniel--
>
> Kristofer is repeating the usual Approval-objection, the same one that
> Robert expressed.
>

Thanks Michael.  I recognized some similarities, but Kristofer is certainly
giving more agreeable, reasonable arguments, and he appears to agree
regarding the value of Approval Voting.   The contention, if there is any,
is about when strategizing is required, and whether it matters.

I agree with him that there is this one bit of strategy required when using
Approval, which is deciding where to draw the line between approval and
disapproval that is possibly affected by what other voters will do, and it
is interesting to understand exactly why this happens.   But I also agree
with you that, when it is not so clear how you might want to strategize
with Approval Voting, where exactly you might draw the line, it doesn't
matter much either.  So there is some strategy required at least sometimes,
but fortunately, it happens mostly when it doesn't matter very much.

But whether this is true depends on some other factors, such as what
happens in earlier stages of the election where it is determined which
candidates will run in this election.  If Approval Voting is used in closed
primary elections, then this will amplify the distinctions between the
nominated candidates for each of the parties, and thus the general election
will be more contentious rather than homing in on the median very quickly.
I'll continue that discussion in another message replying to Kristofer.
(Or maybe we should continue here.)

The popular assumption is that it's essential to try to elect the best
> individual candidate that you can get. Contrary to popular belief, that's
> only an assumption, an unsupported one.
>

I think it is reasonable to expect that everyone should try to elect the
best candidate, but it is not reasonable to expect that everyone can be
satisfied, and I don't think anyone has that assumption.

How much we care about trying to get the best candidate also depends on how
critical it is that we get a half-way descent candidate.  When most of the
candidates are reasonably good, and one of them is likely to win, then it
doesn't matter much.  When there is a large range of quality and a
freakishly high number of bad candidates, then we need to be concerned, but
then the difference is also fairly clear, and Approval Voting will work
very well in that case too.

I like to remind people that, very often, "Good enough is better than
best."  That is, a voting system (or a candidate) that is "good enough" may
very likely better than one that is "best".

> 1. In this country, for the 99%, a progressive government would be
> incomparably better than a Republocrat government (like we've had for a
> long time, and still have).
>
> If you don't believe it, look at some progressive party platforms (Greens,
> etc.), and compare them to the things that people are saying that they
> want, or that they want changed.
>
> So, for the 99%, _any_ progressive would support better policies than_any_
> republocrat.
>
> That means that, for the 99%, there's a strong top-set and a strong
> bottom-set.
>
> ...And, when there is, Approval voting is really simple:
>
> Approve (only) all of your strong top-set.
>
> 2. Suppose we're talking about a better world, in a better future, in
> which the 99% don't have a bottom-set. Or suppose we're talking about some
> other country, or some entirely different non-political
> voting-situation.in which you don't have strong top & bottom sets.
>
> There are various ways that you could vote.
>
> a) If you wanted to, and if any reliable predictive information is
> available, then you could use it for tactical voting. (We're talking about
> voting in Approval).
>
> b) If not, you could, if you wanted to, try to estimate where, in the
> candidate lineuup, your merit-expectation is, and approve down to there, as
> an expectation-maximizing strategy. Depending on what is known or felt
> about the relation between the distributions of voters & candidates, you
> could approve down to the mean, the mid-range, or the median, of the
> candidates' merits.
>
> Of course the median & midrange would be easiest: The midrange is the
> point halfway between the worst & the best. But easiest of all is the
> median. You'd approve the best half of the candidates. That could be
> regarded as a rough estimate for the other two central-tendency measures,
> when they're difficult to estimate.
>

"Approve about half" is a good enough, easy to remember guideline.  It
would seem to maximize your impact as well.

Whether "about half" is good enough does depend where the frontrunners are
in each voter's ordering of candidates, but given that the frontrunners are
likely to be close to the median across all voters anyway, then they will
likely be positioned near the median of most voters' ordering.

> c) But you needn't bother with a) or b).
>
> Even without strong top & bottom-sets, you can still take a guess about
> which set you'd like to elect instead of the other candidates.
>
>
> Maybe, though you don't have strong top & bottom sets, you have _ordinary_
> top & bottom sets, meaning that the merit difference between the sets is
> greater (even if not incomparably greater) than the merit differences
> within those 2 sets.
> If so, you likely will feel like approving (only) all of your (ordinary)
> top-set.
>
> Or maybe even that isn't so, and you don't have any kind of top & bottom
> sets. Maybe the merit gradation is uniform, without any gaps or natural
> dividing-lines. What then?
>
> Well, then you don't know where to make your approval cutoff. You don't
> have an obvious way to choose which set you want to approve over the other.
>
> No problem! If you don't know which set approve, then it doesn't matter!
>
> Just approve as you feel like. Maybe just guess. Maybe flip a coin, or
> draw a number from a bag. Or have the candidates' names in a bag, and draw
> one to choose which one to approve down to. If you don't know which set you
> want to approve, then it doesn't matter which set you approve.
>
> Any such set that you choose by guessing will include the best, and won't
> include the worst, and will be within the range that you feel that the
> approval cutoff should be in. That's good enough! Don't worry about it.
>
> Another thing: If, by guessing or drawing from a bag, you make a choice of
> what set to approve, but, when you start to actually do so, you don't feel
> good about it, then don't do it.
>
> Maybe you'll say to yourself, "This is _disgusting_ !"   Then of course
> don't do it. Don't approve down that far. Go by your feelings.
>
> People who assume, as a starting premise, that it's necessary to get the
> best candidate possible are making things unnecessarily difficult for
> themselves. Even the more elaborate methods, the ranking-methods, do do
> that as reliabliably automcatically as their advocates sometimes seem to
> believe.
>
> By approving (only) your strong top-set, or your ordinary top-set, or
> (absent either of those) a set that is a good guess, within the range where
> you feel that the approval cutoff should be--By approving that set, you're
> maximizing the probability of electing from that set.
>
> And that's good enough.
>
> My message to those who complain that Approval doesn't automatically elect
> the best candidate that you can get is: You worry too much.
>

I'm not so worried about electing the best.  I would worry about electing a
much worse candidate in a surprising upset.  Elections really ought to be
much more boring, but not enough to put us to sleep.

>
> Michael Ossipoff
>

I'm still planning to reply to a couple of your earlier messages with a
couple more comments.

-- 
Daniel LaLiberte
daniel.laliberte at gmail.com
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