[EM] Steve's 2nd Real Democracy, APR and SPPA dialogue with Stephane

steve bosworth stevebosworth at hotmail.com
Sat Jul 25 18:14:00 PDT 2015


Steve's 2nd

Real Democracy, APR and SPPA dialogue with Stephane

> From:
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> Subject:
Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 20
> To:
election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015
19:56:12 -0700
> 2. Re: Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st
dialogue with Stephane
> Rouillon (St?phane Rouillon)
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 22:55:59
> From: St?phane Rouillon
<stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca>
> To:
election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Real
Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane
> Rouillon
Message-ID: <BLU436-SMTP140D793C8BDDBFDF1386B538F830 at phx.gbl>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1";
> Stephane  Rouillon (R)
> R: 1) The
whole document is available from 
You can copy (Ctrl-C) any of the 10 pages in a text document...

> 2) I will read your APR document as soon I find which
software opens 
> .odt document...
>>S: I have
re-sent it using Rich Text (.rtf) format.  I hope this will make it
easier to read.
>Rouillon (R):
For the moment I can only give some comments on your APR comparison.
> am sorry if it sounds negative but it is not. I just want
more details 
> about the few differences between APR and
> 3) Does APR "geographically or
non-geographically defined voluntary 
> organizations (e.g.
political parties, interest groups)" /that/ "will be 
officially recognized as electoral 'associations" prevent
outsiders to infiltrate artificially an electoral 'associations? Like

> partisan of a mainstream idea that would decide to sink
another debate 
> using their strong majority...? Lets suppose
that massive
> supporters of gay weddings want to dilute a more
50%-50% debate about 
> adoption from homosexual parents (just
an example). Would APR detect 
> organized infiltration
>>S: Firstly, for the primary, any
voluntarily organization  applying to become an 'association' could
decide officially to exclude all citizens from becoming a part of its
registered voters for general election purposes other than those
conforming to any criteria it might  publicly specify.  These
criteria would have to be specified within its application to the FEC
and widely published before the relevant APR primary.  Any citizens
not conforming to these criteria could know in advance that they
would not be accepted as registered voters in that 'association'.
If any such citizen
ignored this bar to them and initially seemed to become a registered
voter in the relevant association as a result of the way she ranked
the organizations during the primary, she would later be excluded
from this membership immediately upon the association discovering
that she did not satisfy the criteria.  At that point, she would, by
default, become a registered voter within the geographically defined
association within which she resides.

At the same time, each
applicant organization would want to think very carefully before
excluding anyone because it expects to have more voting power in the
assembly in proportion to the number of citizen who help to elect its
rep(s).  Also, the more registered votes it gains, the more MPs it
would be allowed to send to the assembly.

Finally, it seems to me
that no rational citizen would choose to join an association she
opposes when this means, as a result, she will not be able to join
and support her most favored association during the primary an thus
not be able to help it send more MPs to the assembly in this way.

>R: 4) What happens
if a very low number of APR representatives controls a 
majority (more than 50%) of the parliament voices? Oligarchy?

> >S:  My
article stipulates that no MP would be allowed to retain more that
10% of the weighted votes in the assembly.  Any extra votes received
by a very popular MP would have to be non-returnably transferred to
her trust colleagues.

> 5) SPPA
garantees a stable bipartite coalition around the main political 
parties, despite balanced national split supports like 30%, 18%, 17%,

> 14%, 11% and 10%.
> In such a case, it would boost the
main party to 50% and reduce the 
> mandate to 3/7 of tis
original length to ensure fairness. How does APR 
> handle
unstable splits?

>>S:  Firstly, I
have to admit that at least the 1st APR elected assembly 
could be even more 'split' than your above numbers suggest.  However,
because the ideology and policy agenda of each APR MP is likely to be
much closer to her electorate, I think this also makes it more likely
that each will be trusted, able, and motivated to negotiate any
necessary compromises (even with her opposing MPs) to form and be an
essential part of a working majority coalition.  Separately, I will
email to you (or anyone else) my reason for this expectation (see the
attachment: 'Common Ground').  

That attachment
explains especially why an APR MP would have a strong incentive to
negotiate to become an essential part of a working  majority
coalition so she can have at least some of her own policy aims passed
into law.  However, even these incentives by themselves do not
guarantee that such a majority will always be formed.  This is why I
will also separately email to you a second attachment
outlining  some constitutional arrangements  that some states already
have  and which rationally address the potential danger that a state
might otherwise  become paralyzed if its legislative assembly fails
to form a working majority.  The contingency plans contained in these
 constitutional arrangements  also make it even more likely that such
a majority will be formed. This is because they remove the option for
any MP or group of MPs to hold the assembly or the state to ransom
simply by refusing to cooperate with all other minorities of MPs (see
attachment: 15-secure-executive.   I will also email anyone
else  these attachments upon requests).
> 6) How do
you organize fair debates when a voter can choose between a 
huge amount of candidates?

>>S:  Firstly,
ideally all candidates' campaigns should be basically  facilitated by
 a public media provider like the BBC.  Also, each campaign should be
basically financed by the state in proportion to the numbers of
registered voters each association has received as a result of APR's
primary.  Also, the amount of additional private funds each
association and candidate can spend should be carefully limited by
Secondly, it must be
recalled that the very basic information about every association
would be made widely available  to the public before APR's primary,
as guaranteed by the central electoral commission.   The basic
information about each candidate in the country would be similarly
published  well before the general election.
Thirdly, each
association would want to organize debates between all the candidates
seeking to represent it.  For example, the publicly controlled
internet would be able to facilitate such debates  between the
candidates  seeking to represent  even a small and non-geographically
defined association.
Also, coalitions of
associations would coordinate their campaigns, both to present their
common policies and to attack opposing coalitions or parties. 
Parties (together with any 'associations' that might be affiliated to
them)  would presumably campaign in a similar way.

>>S: I look
forward to receiving your feedback.
R: It might take some time before I comment: plenty of work...
S. Rouillon

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