[EM] 17) APR: Steve's 17th dialogue with Richard Fobes

[steve bosworth]

(17) APR: Steve's 17th
dialogue with Richard Fobes
(Steve)

>
Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2015 12:01:59 -0700

> 

> 1. Re: (16) APR: Steve's short 16th dialogue with Richard Fobes

> (Steve) (Richard Fobes)

> 

>
From: Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org>

> To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"

> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>



R:  Steve, in your latest message (copied below)
you asked several questions for which you want a yes or no answer, but your
introductory wording includes the word "not," which results in
questions that are double negatives. Plus, some of your questions are worded as
if they are a single question, yet actually they are multiple questions. …

 

S:  Sorry for these ambiguities.  However, now that I have read your book, I
will try to answer all the questions that I had in mind in the way that I think
you would have done if I my questions had been free of these ambiguities.  Please correct me if any of these answers do
not reflect an understanding of your VoteFair popularity ranking method:  

 1a) VoteFair popularity ranking could elect
California’s legislative assembly by all of its citizens in one day (i.e. one
day for the primaries and one day for the general election).

1b)
However, even theoretically it could not do this by giving each citizen the opportunity
to rank as few or as many candidates in the whole state as she might wish.  It only gives each citizen in a given
electoral district the opportunity to rank all the candidates seeking to be the
one elected for that district. In doing so, VoteFair ranking has the advantage
over all other single-winner systems in that it guarantees that the one elected
will have been preferred by more voters than any of the other candidates for
that district.

2) At the same time, unlike APR, VoteFair ranking cannot allow each elector to
guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the assembly through the
elected candidate (i.e. rep) she ranked most highly.  APR allows this but no electoral system
(including APR) could guarantee that her rep will always vote exactly as she
might wish. I only claim that APR allows each citizen to guarantee that her one
vote will be add to the weighted vote in the assembly of the rep she most
trusts to vote as she wishes (e.g. the one congressperson among the 435 she
believes is the most like to vote in the House as she wishes).  APR seems to have this representational
advantage over the rep(s) elected by VoteFair or by any other method.

3) Also, unlike APR, VoteFair rankings cannot allow each of its reps to have a
weighted vote in the assembly exactly equal to the number of electors
throughout California who had similarly ranked him most highly.

4) Given a suitable US constitutional amendment, unlike APR, VoteFair ranking could
not allow such a voting system to elect all 435 congresspersons in one day,
i.e. each citizen in the country also being allowed to rank candidates in
states other than the one in which they reside.



R: Here
are my answers:

 VoteFair Ranking takes place during one day
for the primary election, and another (separate) day for the general election.

> When you read my book, pay close attention to the election that Arnold 

> Schwarzenegger won to become governor of California. That was a special 

> election that did not have a primary. As a result, there were more than 

> 100 candidates on the ballot competing in a single race for governor. 

> This demonstrates the essential role of primary elections.

> 

> One of the weaknesses of your APR method is that it does not (yet) 

> accommodate primary elections. I recommend that you modify your method 

> to include them.

 

S: Please
recall our 10th dialogue in which you welcomed my simple description
of how APR would work.  This description included
an explain of how APR’s primary would allow each citizen to determine through
which ‘association’ she will later rank as few or as many candidates in the
whole state (or country) in the general election.  At the same time, I believe we agreed that
the number of candidates would be limited to those who had either submitted
enough signatures of support to the central electoral commission, or had submitted
an appropriate, returnable money deposit. 
Thus, there would appear to be no need for an additional primary to
reduce the number of candidates for an APR general election.  Also, I see APR’s primary as a way of recruiting
the most attractive candidates for the election of a state’s (or the country’s)
legislative assembly.  At the same time,
APR’s way of counting votes easily copes with the rankings of many candidates.

However,
for the election of a governor (or major, or president), I entire agree with
you that VoteFair popularity ranking is the best system.

 

R:  You again asked about wasted votes (although
without using that term).  For VoteFair
Ranking, the worst-case scenario can produce up to 49 percent wasted votes. 

For comparison, your APR method can produce up to 90 percent wasted votes.

………………………….

> Of course both methods can achieve zero percent wasted votes in the 

> best-case scenarios.

> 

> For VoteFair Ranking, the typical real-world range of wasted votes would 

> be about between 30 percent and 15 percent. This is an estimate.

> 

> For your APR method, the typical real-world range of wasted votes would 

> be about between 30 percent and 10 percent. This too is an estimate.

>

S: I need
you to explain the process by which you arrived at these percentages.  I accept that an APR citizen can choose not
to guarantee that her vote will be added to the weighted vote of her most
favoured rep, e.g. when none of the candidates ranked by a citizen are elected,
she can tick the relevant box on the ballot so as to prevent her first choice
but eliminated candidate to transfer her one vote to the rep most favoured by
that eliminated candidate.  However, I
know of no way for us to say that any particular percent of electors will do this.  My claim is only that each APR citizen has the
opportunity to guarantee that her vote will continue to count for one in the
assembly as described above.  What makes
you think this is not the case?

> 

R:  Regarding another question you have,
if VoteFair Ranking were used to 

> elect representatives in the state of California, a voter would only 

> choose among candidates running in their district, yet a vote for a 

> non-winning candidate still influences the results in two or three 

> additional ways -- which you will read about in my book.

 

S: I
understand this but this probable “influence” would seem not to be nearly as
motivating to a citizen as APR’s offer to guarantee that her vote will
mathematically count for one within the weighted vote of her most favoured rep.

 

What do
you think?

> ………………………………

> > Steve



 

 		 	   		  
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