[EM] Fwd: New Criterion

[Jameson Quinn]

May I repeat the request to put terms like
MAM<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MAM>in electorama before you use
them here? For now, that link goes to an empty
page.

(Even CD... I understand that term, and I even think I might have invented
it, but these conversations should be at least theoretically readable to
somebody who doesn't already know all the acronyms.)


2014-05-20 19:42 GMT-04:00 Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>:

> Chris,
>
> for Benham, what if we count fractional (for equal rank top) as you
> suggest when doing the IRV eliminations, but check at each step for a
> pairwise beats all candidate in the usual way?
>
> In your example below, since B beats A pairwise 31 to zero and B beats C
> 65 to 35, no IRV elimination step is required, so how equal rank top is
> counted in this example does not seem to matter.
>
> Or is there some reason for doing a "symmetric completion" of equal
> rankings for the pairwise contests as well?
>
> Forest
>
>
>
>
>> Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 03:53:38 +0930
>>
>> From: "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au>
>> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>  Subject: Re: [EM] New Criterion
>> Message-ID: <537B9DAA.4030406 at adam.com.au>
>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"
>>
>> Forest,
>>
>> I've been meaning to remind you: for  IRV and  Benham   (and Woodall and
>> similar) I'm strongly opposed to allowing voters to do any equal-ranking
>> apart from truncating because it makes Push-over strategizing much less
>> risky and more likely to succeed.
>>
>> Two versions of ER-IRV have been discussed, one where an A=B ballot
>> gives a "whole vote" to each and one where it gives half a vote to each,
>> i.e,
>> ER-IRV(whole) and  ER-IRV(fractional).   The problem I referred to is
>> much worse for the former and so I consider the latter to less bad.
>>
>> But if we insist on allowing above-bottom equal-ranking and don't mind a
>> lot of extra complexity, I have this suggestion:
>>
>> *Before each elimination, order the candidates according to their
>> ER-IRV(fractional), (so that among continuing candidates a ballot that
>> equal-top
>> ranks n candidates give 1/n of a vote to each).
>>
>> Then assign each of the ballots that equal-top rank more than one
>> candidate to whichever of them is highest in that order.
>>
>> Then eliminate the candidate with the fewest ballots assigned to hir.*
>>
>> 34 A=B
>> 31 B
>> 35 C
>>
>> So in this example of Forest's, to create the initial order the 34 A=B
>> ballots give half a vote each to A and B, to give the scores
>> B (31+17=48) > C35 > A17.
>>
>> B is above A in this order, so all of the A=B ballots are assigned to B.
>> This gives the scores B65 > C35 > A0.  A has the lowest score so
>> A is eliminated and B wins.
>>
>> Chris  Benham
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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