[EM] Approval Margins example
cbenham at adam.com.au
Wed May 14 09:31:13 PDT 2014
Originally I conceived Approval Margins as using ballots with an
approval cutoff/threshold, but since then I've largely gone off
allowing voters to rank among unapproved candidates (and the somewhat
more complicated ballot).
But I agree that with that type of ballot Approval Margins is a good
Still, in the example the chicken dilemma is to some extent revived.
Maybe the A voters can be scared into approving B, in which
case maybe the B voters can again get their favourite elected by
"defecting". Arguably it's better for the method to have a kind
of (Strangegloveian) "doomsday machine" defection deterrence.
On 4/30/2014 6:04 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> just change 35 A>B to 35 A>>B, and C wins, unless the B faction gets
> wise and changes to 25 B>>A or 25 B>A, making A the ballot CW.
> The explicit approvals are C40>A35>B25, and since pairwise C beats A
> beats B, Condorect(approval) whether total approval or approval
> margins, elects C.
> MEA and Smith//Approval also elect C.
> Your instincts were right to begin with!
> Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2014 15:53:05 +0930
> From: "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au <mailto:cbenham at adam.com.au>>
> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com
> <mailto:election-methods at electorama.com>>
> Subject: [EM] Correction: Approval Margins fails Chicken Dilemma
> Message-ID: <535F4549.8000908 at adam.com.au
> <mailto:535F4549.8000908 at adam.com.au>>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
> Oops! I've just discovered that my recent claim that Approval Margins
> (and Approval Margins Sort) meets the CD criterion is wrong. Sorry.
> 35 A>B
> 25 B
> 40 C
> B>C>A>B Approvals: B60 > C40 > A35 (Approval Margins Sort
> elects B)
> Approval Margins: A>B -25, B>C +20, C>A +5. B's defeat is the
> weakest so B wins.
> The combination of CD and Plurality says that C must win.
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