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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Forest,<br>
<br>
Originally I conceived Approval Margins as using ballots with an
approval cutoff/threshold, but since then I've largely gone off<br>
allowing voters to rank among unapproved candidates (and the
somewhat more complicated ballot).<br>
<br>
But I agree that with that type of ballot Approval Margins is a
good method.<br>
<br>
Still, in the example the chicken dilemma is to some extent
revived. Maybe the A voters can be scared into approving B, in
which<br>
case maybe the B voters can again get their favourite elected by
"defecting". Arguably it's better for the method to have a kind<br>
of (Strangegloveian) "doomsday machine" defection deterrence.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/30/2014 6:04 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
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<div>Chris,<br>
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just change 35 A>B to 35 A>>B, and C wins,
unless the B faction gets wise and changes to 25
B>>A or 25 B>A, making A the ballot CW.<br>
<br>
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The explicit approvals are C40>A35>B25, and since
pairwise C beats A beats B, Condorect(approval) whether
total approval or approval margins, elects C.<br>
<br>
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MEA and Smith//Approval also elect C.<br>
<br>
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Your instincts were right to begin with!<br>
<br>
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Forest<br>
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Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2014 15:53:05 +0930<br>
From: "C.Benham" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>><br>
To: em <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Subject: [EM] Correction: Approval Margins
fails Chicken Dilemma<br>
Message-ID: <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:535F4549.8000908@adam.com.au">535F4549.8000908@adam.com.au</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed<br>
<br>
<br>
Oops! I've just discovered that my recent
claim that Approval Margins<br>
(and Approval Margins Sort) meets the CD
criterion is wrong. Sorry.<br>
<br>
35 A>B<br>
25 B<br>
40 C<br>
<br>
B>C>A>B Approvals: B60 > C40
> A35 (Approval Margins Sort elects
B)<br>
<br>
Approval Margins: A>B -25, B>C
+20, C>A +5. B's defeat is the<br>
weakest so B wins.<br>
<br>
The combination of CD and Plurality says
that C must win.<br>
<br>
<br>
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