[EM] Methods

Thu Jun 26 04:59:13 PDT 2014

"None of the above" (NOTA) would be a good thing to have, because it would
make it easy to show that you're refusing to vote for anyone because none
of them are any good, not because you're completely satisfied with the
people who are getting elected. ...and that's precisely why we'll never get
NOTA. Without it, our media can claim that the reason why most people don't
vote is that they're completely satisfied. We'd no more be allowed NOTA
than we'd be allowed a voting system other than Plurality, or honest,
inclusive media.

It isn't true that Approval always poses a dilemma about whether to approve
your 2nd choice. In our elections there are always unacceptable candidates.
Don't approve them. You don't want to, and you shouldn't.

If the candididates can be divided into two sets, such that making the
winner not come from one of the sets is considerably more important than
the matter of _which_ member of a set wins, then I call that an
unacceptable/acceptable (u/a) election. Approval strategy is easy in a u/a
election (if there isn't a chicken-dilemma).

Because there often will be a chicken dilemma in official political
elections, a chicken-dilemma-free method is desirable, a method that passes
the Chicken-Dilemma Criterion (CD). IRV passes (most notably) the
Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC) and CD. Benham and Woodall additionally
pass Condorcet. More concisely, Benham and Woodall pass Smith and CD.

At least 6 U.S. political parties offer IRV in their platforms, and I
commend them for that, even though IRV can arguably be improved on by
Benham or Woodall. (That's because Condorcet compliance eases the
strategy-situation for voters who aren't in a mutual majority, and because
it avoids the voting-system's replacment by a dis-satisfied majority).

Regardless of what the voting system is, you shouldn't vote for
unacceptable candidates. If the entire lineup consists of odious
candidates, then boycott the election. Do that as a statement, and organize
for others to do so too. Or just as a personal matter-of-principle. Or just
refuse to vote because you don't feel like voting among a set of odious and
unaccepable candidates.

Other reasons to not vote include:

1. Un-verifable vote-counting
2. Dishonest, agenda-ridden, 1-agenda-promoting media

Both of those make a joke of democracy. Either of those, by itself, would
make a joke of democracy. Of course both are present in our elections,
media and polical system, which is why I don't vote.

If the candidate lineup consists of only Hitler, Bush, Obama, Hillary
Clinton, Idi Amin, etc., then, no matter what the voting-system is, your
best voting-strategy is simple and obvious: Don't vote.

One reason not to is that presumably it hasn't been possible for an
acceptble candidate to get on the ballot. That, by itself, is justification
for boycotting the election (as are the two numbered reasons stated above).

Michael Ossipoff

On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 5:04 PM, robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

> On 6/25/14 3:30 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
>
>>
>> > A voting system should never give the impression that candidates that
>> > are universally loathed are ok. If our candidates were Adolf Hitler,
>>
>> > Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong and
>> > Leopold II of Belgium then approval would rightly illustrate that none
>> > are good candidates. However a ranked system would merely indicate that
>> > one of them is the "condorcet" winner giving no indication that none are
>> > acceptable.
>> >
>> > I think any sane voting system *must* meet this requirement. The ability
>> > for the electorate to unambiguously communicate that none of the
>> > candidates are worthy of the post under contest.
>>
>> But if one of these candidates has to be chosen, the fact that you like
>> none of them is quite irrelevant, because the legitimacy of the winner
>>
>> does not depend on how overwhelmingly he was chosen.
>>
>>
> i can't tell whom you were responding to, Markus.
>
> i would ask the OP to suggest how the "sane voting system [that] *must*
> meet this requirement" does in the event that "None-of-the-above" wins.
>  continue with the existing leadership in government and extend their term?
>  for how long?
>
> also, how would Approval avoid this?  would there be a minimum margin
> that, say, Mao would need to actually win, because certainly *some* voters
> will approve Mao in an Approval system.  what thresholds of approval margin
> is needed to declare that Mao isn't so evil after all?
>
> as always, what do we do about multiple "approvals".  perhaps, in
> comparison, i am least afraid of Mao and Idi compared to the others.  but i
> fear Idi more than Mao.  so i'm voting for Mao as the least of evils,
> should i approve Idi or not?  what if Adolf gets elected because not enough
> of us voted for Idi who came in 2nd?
>
> i totally reject the notion that Approval voting or Score voting requires
> no (or the least) tactic from the voter.
>
> not to say there is no possibility of strategic voting with the ranked
> ballot decided with a Condorcet-compliant method, but any such strategy is
> quite sophisticated and likely to backfire (like trying to elect the
> "Radical Center" over the otherwise "Moderate" that might result in
> electing one extremist or another).  it's *very* unlikely that an organized
> campaign to vote insincerely (say, by burying your sincere second choice in
> a go-for-broke strategy) on the ranked ballot will gather any significant
> support.
>
> setting aside a weird and sophisticated (and organized) strategy (which no
> one will want to risk), the voter has the easiest decision on how to vote
> with a ranked ballot.  who's your favorite candidate?  mark him or her #1.
>  imagine if your favorite was not in the race at all, then who would be
> your favorite?  mark him or her #2.  really tough voting tactic.
>
> but with either Score or Approval, in a multi-candidate race, it's
> *always* difficult for the voter to decide how to vote for their second
> choice.  do you approve your second choice or not?  or how highly do you
> score your second choice?  what if you help your second choice beat your
> first choice?
>
> i wish the Approval and Score advocates would move on from ridiculous
> scenarios and focus on the real problems we have in real elections.
>
> --
>
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
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