[EM] Methods

[robert bristow-johnson]

On 6/25/14 3:30 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
>
> > A voting system should never give the impression that candidates that
> > are universally loathed are ok. If our candidates were Adolf Hitler,
> > Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong and
> > Leopold II of Belgium then approval would rightly illustrate that none
> > are good candidates. However a ranked system would merely indicate that
> > one of them is the "condorcet" winner giving no indication that none 
> are
> > acceptable.
> >
> > I think any sane voting system *must* meet this requirement. The 
> ability
> > for the electorate to unambiguously communicate that none of the
> > candidates are worthy of the post under contest.
>
> But if one of these candidates has to be chosen, the fact that you like
> none of them is quite irrelevant, because the legitimacy of the winner
> does not depend on how overwhelmingly he was chosen.
>

i can't tell whom you were responding to, Markus.

i would ask the OP to suggest how the "sane voting system [that] *must* 
meet this requirement" does in the event that "None-of-the-above" wins.  
continue with the existing leadership in government and extend their 
term?  for how long?

also, how would Approval avoid this?  would there be a minimum margin 
that, say, Mao would need to actually win, because certainly *some* 
voters will approve Mao in an Approval system.  what thresholds of 
approval margin is needed to declare that Mao isn't so evil after all?

as always, what do we do about multiple "approvals".  perhaps, in 
comparison, i am least afraid of Mao and Idi compared to the others.  
but i fear Idi more than Mao.  so i'm voting for Mao as the least of 
evils, should i approve Idi or not?  what if Adolf gets elected because 
not enough of us voted for Idi who came in 2nd?

i totally reject the notion that Approval voting or Score voting 
requires no (or the least) tactic from the voter.

not to say there is no possibility of strategic voting with the ranked 
ballot decided with a Condorcet-compliant method, but any such strategy 
is quite sophisticated and likely to backfire (like trying to elect the 
"Radical Center" over the otherwise "Moderate" that might result in 
electing one extremist or another).  it's *very* unlikely that an 
organized campaign to vote insincerely (say, by burying your sincere 
second choice in a go-for-broke strategy) on the ranked ballot will 
gather any significant support.

setting aside a weird and sophisticated (and organized) strategy (which 
no one will want to risk), the voter has the easiest decision on how to 
vote with a ranked ballot.  who's your favorite candidate?  mark him or 
her #1.  imagine if your favorite was not in the race at all, then who 
would be your favorite?  mark him or her #2.  really tough voting tactic.

but with either Score or Approval, in a multi-candidate race, it's 
*always* difficult for the voter to decide how to vote for their second 
choice.  do you approve your second choice or not?  or how highly do you 
score your second choice?  what if you help your second choice beat your 
first choice?

i wish the Approval and Score advocates would move on from ridiculous 
scenarios and focus on the real problems we have in real elections.

-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."