[EM] Voter strategising ability

[robert bristow-johnson]

Jameson, i am assuming you meant this for the list.

*wow*!  i would have never expected a real-world election where it would 
have mattered (in the outcome) whether it was a Shulze or Ranked-Pairs 
Condorcet method.  not that the Romania 2009 was *any* Condorcet, but 
was it STV and is the ballot data available?  otherwise i would ask, how 
do we know how be the Smith set was?

bestest,

r b-j

On 7/24/14 12:31 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I believe that cycles in real-life, contentious Condorcet elections 
> would be rare — on the order of 1-2% of elections, or a bit lower if 
> your data include "elections" with only one serious candidate. 
> However, when a Condorcet cycle does happen, it basically implies the 
> existence of at least three separate, more-or-less coherent factions 
> in the electorate. In that case, there's no particular reason that 
> there shouldn't be 2 "quasi-clone" candidates from one of those 
> factions. Thus I'd expect 4-member Smith sets to be almost a third of 
> all Smith sets larger than 1; not "*never*" as Robert suggests. In 
> fact, it is possible that Romania 2009 
> <http://rangevoting.org/Romania2009.html> had a 4-member Smith set.
>
>
> 2014-07-24 0:11 GMT-04:00 robert bristow-johnson 
> <rbj at audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>>:
>
>     On 7/23/14 2:17 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>
>         On 20 Jul 2014, at 22:48, Kristofer
>         Munsterhjelm<km_elmet at t-online.de
>         <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>>  wrote:
>
>             Discussion about which kind of strategy is most likely to
>             happen can go on forever without data. Even if there is
>             data, it is quite easy and/or tempting to explain it away
>             as not being representative of what would happen under an
>             ordinary election. As long as that's possible, it's really
>             hard to convince someone who is worried about burial not
>             to be, or vice versa.
>
>         Unfortunately we don't have data from very many Condorcet
>         elections.
>
>
>     but the *data* doesn't give a rat's ass *how* it's counted or
>     tabulated.  can't we use the data from all ranked-choice elections
>     (which, in government, would be IRV or RCV or AV or STV or Hare)
>     and see how they would work out with Condorcet-compliant rules?
>      like we did for Burlington 2009.  that was a 4-way election close
>     enough that the Plurality (of 1st choice votes) winner, the IRV
>     winner, and the Condorcet winner were three different candidates.
>      and yet there was *no* cycle.  not even close to a cycle.
>
>     are there any other ranked-choice elections where media or
>     research could access the anonymous ballot data and see if there
>     would have been a cycle and then see how Shulze and Tideman and
>     Minimax and Kemeny would have been different?  i think we would
>     virtually never see a cycle.  and *more* than virtually, i think
>     we would *never* see a cycle with more than 3 in the Smith set.
>
>
>           And those elections have been quite non-competitive. So we
>         don't know very well what would happen (in different
>         societies) in competitive Condorcet elections.
>
>
>     but with ballot data in public records (and a little bit of
>     computer programming), we *should* be able to use all that IRV
>     ballot data and see what might happen in hypothetical
>     Condorcet-compliant elections.
>
>
>     -- 
>
>     r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>
>
>     "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
>
>     ----
>     Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
>     list info
>
>


-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."