[EM] [CES #10006] Re: New BR numbers (preliminary)

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Jan 9 17:05:57 PST 2014

2014/1/9 Clay Shentrup <clay at electology.org>

> > in the median method (here, MAV), the voters strategize to ensure that
> their grades for the two frontrunners straddle the honest top two medians,
> but they do not necessarily go all the way to an approval-style ballot.
> Now if we just had some evidence this was remotely realistic...

... or any evidence that it wasn't.

We don't know how actual voters will behave. Your assumption that the
strategic ones will use approval strategy is just as baseless as mine that
they'll (roughly) use straddle strategy.

I'm working on getting relevant data using my mturk research.


ps. I have more BR numbers, including one-sided strategy, which I'll post
later. (And no, I don't think that 100% one-sided strategy is at all
realistic, but I do think that including it in the sims gives interesting
numbers, because insofar as even one-sided strategy is not effective, there
will be less incentive to be strategic on either side.)
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