[EM] Comments on a posting from Benjamin Grant

[Dick Burkhart]

A majority party could do better by running clones and encouraging random
ranking of their clones, but a minority party that is strong enough and well
enough focused on their top candidates could still win some representation,
unlike the present winner-take-all systems.

However, if the stakes are high enough and the barriers to entry low enough
that clone campaigns are perceived to be a problem, then there you could
either do proportional representation directly or in primary election. For
example, if a political party of voting block should have elected 2.15
candidates in a proportional primary, then let their top 3 candidates go on
to the general election instead of a full slate. A voting block representing
0.55 candidates would get only their top candidate into the general
election. 

I have a clustering algorithm which identifies voting blocks from voting
patterns and their ideal representation (fractional number of positions).
And in my version of Borda, if a voter ranks less than a full slate, the
uncast tallies are divided equally (as fractions) among the remaining
candidates, providing an incentive to rank allied candidates.

Dick Burkhart
4802 S Othello St,  Seattle, WA  98118
206-721-5672 (home)  206-851-0027 (cell)
dickburkhart at comcast.net

-----Original Message-----
From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Kevin
Venzke
Sent: January 04, 2014 12:32 PM
To: election-methods at electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Comments on a posting from Benjamin Grant

Hi Dick,


________________________________
De : Dick Burkhart <dickburkhart at comcast.net> À : 'Michael Ossipoff'
<email9648742 at gmail.com>; election-methods at electorama.com Envoyé le : Samedi
4 janvier 2014 13h50 Objet : Re: [EM] Comments on a posting from Benjamin
Grant

>The fundamental problem with criteria based  on “X over Y” preferences 
>(Condorcet, Mutual

>Majority, etc.) is that all such criteria ignore the intensity of the 
>preference (a ranking

>of 5 to1 counts the same as 3 to 2, for example). This is why 
>Borda-type methods are

>superior – they don’t throw away critical information. Donald Saari 
>explains the

>mathematics of this well in “Decisions and Elections”.

The trouble is that when a method values intensity of preference, it also
generally creates incentive to misrepresent the intensity. This has to be
carefully managed. Furthermore plain Borda has a problem with encouraging
clone nominations. So, over the last ~16 years, the EM list has not seen
many Borda advocates except for those proposing ways to try to fix it.

Kevin

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