[EM] Chain Climbing - (aside) Mutual exclusion between decision and reason

[Michael Allan]

Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
> I think I read of something like that as well, but I can't remember
> just where. The closest I *can* remember is a paper about
> computational hardness in manipulating election methods, where the
> authors said that all methods that pass a certain weak type of
> monotonicity can be easily manipulated. But I think it was Warren
> who said that these results aren't important in any case because in
> most real world elections, there are only a few candidates and thus
> every method is easily manipulable if you know every other vote.

Still, it seems important in theory.

> Perhaps one could consider votes in assembly to constitute the
> decisive method and votes for the representatives to be the rational
> method. ...

Yes, or something on those lines.  The laws decided by an *un-elected*
legislature are (from the viewpoint of the citizen who must obey them)
absolutely irrational.  It follows that a pairing with elections must
bring in *some* reason.

> I'm unsure of how to generalize this to say, delegate proxy systems,
> however.

For me, that's where I'm coming from.  I'm led to induce a general
principle based on my particular experience with transitive voting
systems.  Every attempt to extract a decision seems to undermine the
function (true, truthful expression) of the system.  Yet left alone,
it seems to run perfectly.

I haven't read much decision theory, but was thinking we might *also*
approach it in terms of reason.  Kant says reason depends on freedom.
While freedom is objectively impossible in nature (all locked up in
chains of cause and effect), reason must nevertheless *subjectively*
view itself as free. *

Decision destroys freedom.  That's its purpose, to eliminate all
freedom within its scope.  It follows that decision and reason are
mutually exclusive.  Reason can reason about decision, and without it,
but never within it, nor through it.  Reason itself cannot be
decisive, nor can a decision itself be rational.  Yet, side by side,
and independently, the two *can* be in agreement.

-- 
Mike


 * Immanuel Kant.  1785.  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
   Translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, 2012. Cambridge
   University Press.  4:446-63

      Reason must view herself as the authoress of her principles,
      independently of alien influences, and must consequently, as
      practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, by herself
      be viewed as free... From this stem all judgements about actions
      such that they *ought* to have been *done* even if they *were
      not done*.  (4:448, 55)

   http://books.google.ca/books?id=qfyKv1a-lPAC


Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
> On 04/27/2014 06:24 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
> > Forest Simmons said:
> >> You are absolutely right about the heart of the Chicken Dilemma;
> >> there is no way to tell from the above ballot set alone who the real
> >> winner should be, because different sincere scenarios lead to the
> >> same set of ballots. ...
> >>
> >> Where do we go from here?
> >
> > I suspect that a system (here an electoral decision system) cannot be
> > both rational (sincere, anomaly free) and decisive at the same time.
> 
> I think I read of something like that as well, but I can't remember just 
> where. The closest I *can* remember is a paper about computational 
> hardness in manipulating election methods, where the authors said that 
> all methods that pass a certain weak type of monotonicity can be easily 
> manipulated. But I think it was Warren who said that these results 
> aren't important in any case because in most real world elections, there 
> are only a few candidates and thus every method is easily manipulable if 
> you know every other vote.
> 
> > I have no formal proof.  But I think we must step outside the decision
> > system.  It takes a combination of systems - one rational, say, and
> > one decisive - brought into a mutual relation in order to act (elect)
> > both rationally and decisively.
> 
> Another option is to weaken the impact. If the election is multi-winner, 
> it might be possible for a group of voters to manipulate the method for 
> some of the winners, but not all of them. In contrast, in a 
> single-winner election, if the strategizers succeed, they win it all.
> 
> Although Sainte-Laguë degrades to Plurality when there's only one seat 
> and thus is based on it, talk of strategy isn't nearly as prevalent here 
> as it is in the US (which has a Plurality single-winner election and 
> single-member districts).
> 
> Perhaps one could consider votes in assembly to constitute the decisive 
> method and votes for the representatives to be the rational method. I've 
> also seen papers argue that in-assembly votes work more like game theory 
> predicts (at least for smaller assemblies) and so that equilibrium 
> results that predict the Condorcet winner of a proposal will be elected 
> are more applicable there.
> 
> I'm unsure of how to generalize this to say, delegate proxy systems, 
> however.