[EM] Fwd: Is Chain Climbing really independent of clones??
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Mon Apr 21 11:21:45 PDT 2014
It was requested that I forward this message, too, to EM:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Steve Eppley <SEppley at alumni.caltech.edu>
Date: Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 7:22 PM
Subject: Is Chain Climbing really independent of clones??
To: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
The "least implicit approval" score used in Chain Climbing doesn't look
cloneproof.
Under Plurality Rule, two "top" clones can split their vote, allowing a
third candidate to win by spoiling. Chain Climbing seems very similar: Two
"bottom" clones can split their "implicit disapproval" so that a third
candidate will instead be added to S.
Begin with the example from my recent email:
5: A B C
4: B C A
3: C A B
First add C to S since C is bottom-ranked by the most (5).
Then add B to S since only B is unbeaten pairwise by a candidate in S.
Then elect B.
Suppose we add a clone of C:
3: A B C C'
2: A B C' C
4: B C C' A
3: C C' A B
First add A to S since A is bottom-ranked by the most (4).
Now B can never be added to S since B is beaten pairwise by a candidate in
S.
Have I made a mistake?
--Steve
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