No subject

isn't unusual for preferrers of non-big-2 candidates to insincerely rank in 
first place the big-2 candidate whom they like better than the other big-2 
candidate, to avoid "wasting [their] vote". Australia has had IRV for a 
along time, but parties are still mostly unwilling to run more than 1 
candidate per election, contrary to the hopes when IRV was adopted.


So what concepts
do they have? They have the concept that political parties that win 
single-seat elections are those
that get lots of votes, including lots of first-preference ("primary") 
votes. They have the concept
that the winner definitely should never be the Majority Loser.

I reply:

IRV's flagrant majority rule violations are just as obviously wrong as 
Majority Loser violations. Majority Loser violations are a special case. IRV 
doesn't need a special case like that in order to fail.

You continued:

They have the concept that votes for
losing  candidates should not be avoidably completely "wasted".

I reply:

You mean the way they're wasted in IRV when the compromise that you need 
gets eliminated because your traveling vote didn't reach hir in time? So 
that your preference for hir over someone worse was never counted?

You continued:

They have a concept that elections
are not purely about who wins, but also about things like identity, 
self-expression, political
principles

I reply:

Well then, you've just told why the experience there isn't applicable here: 
American progressives care about who wins, and they're quite willing to 
flush their principles and self-expression down the toilet if they believe 
that it's the pragmatic thing to do, to elect a lesser-evil. Case closed.

You continued:

and  (sometimes class-based)party-loyalty. Very few voters in Australia are 
remotely
interested in strategising, and in (at least)some countries that even use 
Plurality, surprisingly
few are.

I reply:

...which demonstrates that there's no reason to expect U.S. voters to vote 
as those others do, in IRV either, if, for instance Australian voters 
strategize less than U.S. voters do. (But, as I've said, I've been told that 
favorite-burial strategy isn't unusual in Australia either).

You continued:

So instead of "elect the CW", and apart from (the admittedly somewhat 
circular) "elect the sincere
IRV winner", what do I mean by "perform reasonably"? The method chooses the 
winner in a (somewhat)
intuitive and orderly manner,without appearing to "waste" more than half the 
votes
I
I reply:

40: AB
25: B
35: CB

A wins. 60% had voted that they'd rather elect B than A. Do you really 
believe that their votes weren't wasted? Maybe you mean something different 
by "wasted", but definitely their B>A vote was ignored by IRV, resulting in 
a majority rule violation.

Ignore the voted wishes of a majority, and you have a majority rule 
violation. IRV will have many avoidable majorilty rule violations.

You continued:

There are many quite intelligent and thoughtful voters in Australia, to whom 
it has never occured
that there might be any better single-winner election method.

I reply:

There are people there trying to tell them different. You could help.

You continued:

They have failed to notice IRV's
"absurd non-monotonicity", and they have no concept of the "CW".

I reply:

Our voters, whether or not they have a concept of the CW, will do what it 
takes to elect the CW.

You continued:

They would laugh at Approval.

I reply:

Of course it's easy to say that without backing it up in any way. They 
haven't been asked about Approval. You don't know how they'd react. You're 
trying to speak for them. Approval is one of the most popular alternative 
methods.

Some object to Approval because of a mistaken interpretation of 
"one-person-one-vote", but that is avoided if Approval is presented as a CR 
version. Mention CR 0-10, and then CR 0,1.

Anyway, the topic was about the actual relative merits of IRV & Approval, 
not your unsubstantiated claim about how someone would react to a method 
that they have never heard of before.

You continued:

I think in many countries, even the US...

I reply:

Now you're getting even farther from justifiability, telling us how people 
in another country would react to what they've never heard of.

Admittedly Approval would be new to them. But you're speculating about their 
reaction.

You continued:

..., voters and political parties would hate approval.

I reply:

Why would voters hate Approval more than Plurality? Because it lets them 
always vote for their favorite instead of having to strategically abandon 
hir? Because it gives them the freedom to vote for and show support for 
people they like better than their Plurailty compromise?

Your claim is not only unjustified, it's absurd.

Of course, as you said, the Democrat & Repulican parties would hate 
Approval. Or Condorcet wv, or any good method, because it would end their 
artificial monopoly.

You continued:

If I
were to be persuaded to drop my Clone Independence standard and take a 
limited-slot method seriously,
I would go for one of Kevin Venzke's 3-slot methods, like "Withdrawable 
Approval".


I reply:

Sure, Approval can be improved upon by more elaborate methods. Especially 
Condorcet wv. Approval's appeal is that it needs only a very modest change 
from Plurality, with no new balloting or counting technology.

You continued:

As it is, I think most promising-looking for public political elections is 
probably something from
the "automated approval" family (which uses ranked ballots).

I reply:

That sounds like Bucklin or DSV(Approval). Well, then propose those instead 
of IRV.

Mike Ossipoff

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