[EM] Chicken Dilemma--To whom is it a problem?

[Michael Ossipoff]

A small typo:

I said that in Benham the Democrats came in 12th.

I meant to say that in Benham the Democrat came in 6th.

Michael Ossipoff

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> Hi Mike,
>
> First, regarding the CD criterion and SDSC: They are, it seems
> to me, almost totally incompatible. Not just incidentally but
> even in their philosophical approach to the situation. This is
> why CD makes me skittish.
>
> CD says that when the votes look like this, and A is the winner:
>
> 26 A>B
> 25 B>A
> 49 C
>
> Then in this election, B cannot be the winner:
>
> 26 A>B
> 25 B
> 49 C
>
> "Votes-only" versions of SDSC say that C can't win. So if we
> were to satisfy both CD and SDSC we would only be able to
>
> elect A (and I wouldn't see that as viable for a proposal
>
> personally).
>
>
> In the scenario where B voters truncate, SDSC essentially
>
> wants to find a majority (even hidden beneath the unviable
> A preferences) and count it if possible. This is similar in
> spirit to FBC because it means that the A voters can defeat
> C while still expressing their support for A. It doesn't
>
> harm B.
>
> But CD looks at this scenario and concludes that somebody
> deserves a beating, and the only way to do it is to punish both
> A and B voters.
>
> My concern is that I think scenario #2 is likely in the
> "near term" (given adoption of a rank method), and that it is
> likely sincere, or at least not intentionally insincere.
>
>
>
>
> ----- Mail original -----
>> De : Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>  Sure. If they can enact a system that ensures they always have
>>>  incentive to vote as a mutual majority, then they don't have any
>>>  need of e.g. SDSC.
>>>
>>>  But this is a long ways off.
>>
>>>  Isn't there a sense in which it's
>>>  "more realistic," as you say above, to be concerned about whether
>>>  methods satisfy SDSC, or other criteria which could be useful to
>>>  parties that can't win in the short term but want to at least
>>>  collect their share of the votes?
>>
>> I haven't evaluated by SDSC for quite a while. I used to apply it to
>> compare some wv Condorcet methods to other methods, but I don't know
>> how Benham & Woodall do by it.
>>
>> I'm not saying that I have a monopoly on saying what's practical.
>> You're referring to a time before there is a progressive majority,
>> right?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>>
>> Before there's a progressive majority, there isn't any good outcome
>> that we can hope for, and I feel that Plurality is the only voting
>> system that we'll have.  And are you assuming that we can enact a new
>> voting system under Republocrat rule? If we could, then, for current
>> conditions, it would be best to have one that meets FBC. I just feel
>> that if we could ever get a better voting system, it would probably be
>> _after_ electing a progressive govt, via Plurality strategy.
>>
>> I'm in the odd position of having to ask how my own criterion (SDSC)
>> applies.  ..for which conditions (current, or Green scenaio) it
>> usefully measures merit...and in what way.  I remember the definition
>> of SDSC, and that it shows some benefits of wv Condorcet. But wv
>> Condorcet would undeniably give favorite-burial need, under current
>> conditions. For Green scenario conditions then?
>>
>
> No, I meant near-term conditions.
>
> SDSC is satisfied by WV methods, yes, but it's not incompatible with
> FBC. Examples are MDDA, MAMPO, ICA, ER-Bucklin(whole). None are
> Condorcet methods though (but ICA is quite close).
>
> I suspect that you, at some point, ruled out MDDA etc. due to the
> chicken dilemma. Assuming we might agree that SDSC is useful for near-
> term elections (and maybe we can't), I guess that there isn't going to
> be one method that is both a good "near term" method and also a good
> Green scenario method.
>
> Kevin Venzke
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