[EM] Re2: Fobes wrt IRV w. relatively few competitive candidates.

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 01:44 PM 5/29/2013, David L Wetzell wrote:
>I believe the diff IRV makes makes it worth it.  Given the current 
>habits of the US, I don't see "advanced-systems" havinge sufficient 
>additional value-added to justify switching from the extensive 
>marketing campaign already in place for IRV.  If things evolve, it 
>will be easier to switch from IRV, in part because of widespread 
>habituation to IRV and how it'll make it harder for those who 
>benefit from the status quo to divide and conquer advocates of reform.

This has been, of course, the FairVote argument for a long time. 
FairVote, however, did not merely market IRV. They also deprecated 
other systems, such that the President of FairVote Arizona, putting 
on her Arizona League of Women Voters President hat, lobbied against 
the recent Approval initiative based on old FairVote arguments that 
actually did not apply to the circumstances where Approval has been 
proposed, old and discredited arguments, which she did not 
understand, promoted by FairVote. That's the problem with a divisive 
marketing campaign!

And it can backfire.

IRV was known as a seriously defective single-winner voting system, 
since it was proposed as the Ware system. It's a "make the world safe 
for major parties" system. It breaks down badly when a third party 
starts to attain parity, or passes parity, as in Burlington.

The FairVote campaign oversold IRV, and there is a backlash, 
implementations are being rescinded. Previously, IRV was dumped for 
(unfair) political reasons, as in Ann Arbor, MI. Much rescinding of 
late has not been unfair like that. It's been based on substantial 
method failure.

Because FairVote focused only on IRV for single-winner elections, it 
was not prepared for this. It recommended IRV blindly, regardless of 
context. In Burlingon, it's obvious, instead of going back to a 
plurality-satisfied (40% ) runoff voting, a hybrid could have been 
proposed: Bucklin, using the same 3-rank ballot, can handle a 
three-party situation with ease, tending to find a majority, and if 
no majority were found, it's then possible to design an optimal 
runoff. FairVote should be *ready* with alternatives, and ready to 
recommend them, not just to slink away.

In Arizona, it's quite possible that IRV could be ruled 
unconstitutional, because of the "most legal votes" standard of the 
Arizona constitution. IRV discards and does not consider some legal 
votes. Some it counts, some it does not, treating ballots 
differently. It's a problem. Because court decisions with regard to 
voting systems do not always consider all the issues, I can't predict 
how the Arizona Supreme Court would rule.

If my argument here is legally supported, what, then, should FairVote 
Arizona recommend, short of amending the constitution? Is Arizona hopeless?

Hint: Bucklin counts all the votes, and uses them. (There could be an 
issue with unused ranks, but my sense is that this would pass muster, 
because all ballots are treated equally, and all ranks are either 
counted or not.)

Bucklin is "American preferential voting." Yet FairVote used invented 
arguments to discredit Bucklin, not election science. FairVote 
supported the decision in Brown v. Smallwood, when that decision 
would just as easily have dumped IRV, the arguments would be quite 
similar. The decision was idiosyncratic, not supported anywhere else, 
and not supported by the current Minnesota court. The point is that 
FairVote distorted the information available to the public, pursuing 
a narrow campaign for a particular method.

The case can be made that FairVote has done significant damage to 
election reform in the U.S., by attacking runoff voting, widely 
recognized as more democratic than raw plurality. Instead of 
*improving* runoff voting, IRV gutted it as an expensive nuisance. 
Replacing it with an expensive single-ballot system missing most of 
the advantages of actual runoff voting.

I'm hoping that FairVote will begin to cooperate with the Center for 
Election Science. We have certain common goals, most notably 
proportional representation. The question of optimal voting system is 
often dependent on the specific circumstances of a jurisdiction, and 
that, as well, can be studied. Yes, political practicality is a 
crucial issue for an advocacy group, but if what is advocated is 
*actually harmful*, what then? We need clear-thinking activists *and* 
we need election science.

How about it, David?