[EM] Re2: Fobes wrt IRV w. relatively few competitive candidates.

[David L Wetzell]

>
> On 5/28/2013 12:51 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> >> Richard Fobes wrote:
> >>     Plurality voting and limited voting (and the Borda count if the
> voters
> >>     are undisciplined) are about the only methods that _cannot_ handle
> 3 or
> >>     (maybe) 4 popular choices along with any number of unpopular
> choices.
> >
> > So you agree that IRV works w. relatively few popular candidates?
>
> The results for IRV get worse as the number of candidates increase.
>
> Condorcet methods give fair results regardless of the number of
> candidates.  Approval voting gives reasonably fair results regardless of
> the number of candidates.
>
> IRV can usually -- but not always -- handle 3 candidates.  And IRV can
> sometimes handle 4 candidates.  But IRV becomes quite unreliable -- and
> also vulnerable to strategic voting -- if there are 5 or more candidates.
>

dlw: So if there is a feedback from the election rule used that tends to
change the number of competitive candidates then it might make sense to
first push IRV and then
something more "advanced" later on, after the expected number of candidates
rises?


>
> >      > So it seems disengaged from reality to let C, the number of
> >     candidates,
> >      > go to infinity... and if a lot of candidates are not going to get
> >      > elected then to disregard voter info/preference over them is of
> much
> >      > less consequence.
> >
> >     Although the number of popular candidates is now small, that's
> because
> >     we use plurality voting.  When we use better voting methods, the
> number
> >     of popular candidates will increase; of course not to infinity, but
> >     frequently beyond the 3 or 4 popular choices that IRV can handle with
> >     fairness.
> >
> > dlw: This is a conjecture.  One that I don't think makes economic sense
> > when one considers all that is entailed with a competitive campaign for
> > an important single-seat election.
>
> The biggest campaign contributors (a.k.a. special interests) have forced
> voters into the Republican and Democratic parties, and then taken
> control of the primary elections of both parties by taking advantage of
> vote splitting.  All sorts of things will change when these constraints
> are removed.
>

dlw: These constraints won't per se be removed entirely.
Special interests will still exist and $peech will still matter for
elections, regardless
of what election rules get used.

If there exists varying cognitive limits in voters, it doesn't negate the
need for electoral reform but it does mitigate the scope for expanding the
number of competitive candidates/parties, or how much merely changing the
single-winner election rule used would make a difference.

I believe the diff IRV makes makes it worth it.  Given the current habits
of the US, I don't see "advanced-systems" havinge sufficient additional
value-added to justify switching from the extensive marketing campaign
already in place for IRV.  If things evolve, it will be easier to switch
from IRV, in part because of widespread habituation to IRV and how it'll
make it harder for those who benefit from the status quo to divide and
conquer advocates of reform.

>
> My point is that Condorcet and Approval methods can handle whatever
> number of parties arise.  In contrast, IRV will fail if there turn out
> to be more than 3 or 4 effective parties, so IRV is not a reliable choice.
>

You mean IRV is not reliable if it becomes reasonable to expect for there
to be more than 3 or 4 effective candidates in a single-winner election...
 This is not the case in the US today.

>
> >     Although it's a non-governmental example, take a look at the current
> >     VoteFair American Idol poll.  The number of popular music genres is
> >     about 5, and there are about 7 singers who get more than a few
> >     first-choice votes.
> >
> >     http://www.votefair.org/cgi-bin/votefairrank.cgi/votingid=idols
> >
> >     IRV would correctly identify the most popular music genre (based on
> >     current results), but probably would not correctly identify the most
> >     popular singer.
> >
> > Apples and Oranges.
> > There's no serious economic costs to competing in American Idol and so
> > the number of competitive singers is not naturally hampered by that and
> > the need for a large support base or expensive advertisements or
> > connections for important endorsements.
>
> Here you seem to be saying that IRV is OK in governmental elections even
> though it can't handle a singing contest.
>

Only because the number of competitive candidates tends to be significantly
lower, as is consistent with my economics-based argument.

>
> >     Why would voters trust a voting method that stops getting fair
> results
> >     with so few popular candidates?
> >
> > Because when one considers the potential candidates have for taking on
> > ideas, there isn't a need for a large number of candidates to make the
> > de facto center much more like the true center.
> >
> > Only among theorists does one constrain candidates to fixed positions in
> > policy-spaces.
>
> Actually I see politics as multi-dimensional, which is why I don't talk
> about left and center and right (because that's one-dimensional).
>

dlw: But any multi-dim policy-space can be collapsed into a one-dim system.
 So left/center/right can still prove useful... and my more important point
about candidates/parties shifting within the one or multi-dim system still
holds in mitigating the import of raising the number of competitive
candidates.

We can increase the expected quality of competitive candidates w.o.
increasing the expected number of competitive candidates much.

>
> >     Yes, IRV is easy to explain, but that advantage becomes unimportant
> as
> >     the number of popular candidates increases, which it will when better
> >     voting methods are adopted.
> >
> > That may be your story, but when one adds realism with folks able to
> > express voice thru other means besides voting then it becomes less
> > important to amp up C much.  The non-competitive candidates can still
> > move the center.
>
> I don't know what your words here mean.  As I said, "center" implies
> one-dimensional thinking, and I see things as multi-dimensional (which
> means there is lots of cross-party voting [although mainstream media
> mistakenly calls those voters "undecided"]).
>

dlw: There is still a center in a multi-dim system and it's not per se
either multi-dim or single-dim, since a multi-dim can be collapsed into a
single-dim.

>
> > And the opportunity cost of trying to settle on an alternative
> > alternative to FPTP than IRV will become apparent.
>
> I support the idea of having (initially, small) organizations try out
> different kinds of voting and letting that process educate citizens as
> to what works and what doesn't.
>

dlw: But if the scale is small then the number of competitive candidates
will tend to be bigger, which in turn will affect the relative value of IRV
vs non-IRV and so there needs
to be a mindfulness of how the expected number of competitive candidates
matters.

>
> This means I oppose the belief that IRV is the only method that should
> be tried.  It has been tried, and the results have not been impressive.
>

dlw: The jury is still out and there's also an aggressive status quo that
has a strong perverse incentive to stir up rivalries among advocates for
different electoral alternatives to FPTP. As an advocate for alternative
rules than IRV you aren't the most disengaged person from the assessment of
the evicence.

>
> One broader point underlies this discussion.  A major reason why the
> U.S. has only two political parties is that if a third-party
> Presidential candidate gets even a (relatively) few _electoral_ votes,
> that would likely block a majority of votes going to either the
> Republican or Democratic candidate, and that would throw the election
> into the House of Representatives (with each state getting one vote),
> and the House is not going to choose the third-party candidate.  That
> scenario has happened in the past, and the after-effect is the
> abandonment of an otherwise strong third party.  IRV would not solve
> this problem, yet many proponents of IRV seem to think it would, and
> accordingly (but mistakenly) they promote IRV as a way to help third
> parties grow in popularity.
>

dlw: I doubt anyone who supports 3rd parties wants IRV alone.  IRV in our
prez election wd get 3rd party candidates R-E-S-P-E-C-T and help them to
move the "de facto" political center that the two major parties tend to
center around.  They may want that a lot more than an end to our two-party
system.

For there's nothing intrinsic to a two-party dominated system to be as
dysfunctional as our current two-party dominated system with its tilt
towards becoming a single-party dominated system.
dlw

>
> Richard Fobes
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 18:58:23 +0200
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
> To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] In political elections C (in terms of serious
>         candidates w. an a priori strong chance of election) will never get
>         large!
> Message-ID: <51A633AF.3000104 at lavabit.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> On 05/29/2013 12:15 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 4:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> > <km_elmet at lavabit.com <mailto:km_elmet at lavabit.com>> wrote:
> >
> >     On 05/27/2013 09:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> >
> >         Smith's http://rangevoting.org/__PuzzIgnoredInfo.html
> >         <http://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html>
> >
> >         needs to be taken w. a grain of salt.
> >
> >         The short-comings of IRV depend on the likely number of serious
> >         candidates whose a priori odds of winning, before one assigns
> >         voter-utilities, are strong.  If real life important
> single-winner
> >         political elections have economies of scale in running a serious
> >         election then it's reasonable to expect only 1, 2 or 3 (maybe 4
> >         once in
> >         a blue moon) candidates to have a priori, no matter what
> >         election rule
> >         gets used, serious chance to win, while the others are at best
> >         trying to
> >         move the center on their key issues and at worse potential
> >         spoilers in a
> >         fptp election.
> >
> >
> >     That argument is too strong in the sense that it can easily be
> >     modified to lead to any conclusion you might wish. And it can be
> >     modified thus because it is too vague.
> >
> >
> > Hi Karl, good to hear from you again.  I doubt economies of scale args
> > are completely flexible and the evidence need not be as rigorously
> > presented when one is initially communicating ideas.
>
> Who is Karl?
>
> >     Let me be more precise. You may claim that if there're some
> >     economies of scale, then it's reasonable to only expect 1, 2 or 3
> >     viable candidates. But here's a problem. Without any data, you can
> >     posit that the economies of scale kick in at just the right point to
> >     make 2.5-party rule inevitable even under Condorcet, say. But
> >     without any data, I could just as well posit that the economies of
> >     scale, if any, kick in at n = 1000; or, I could claim that the
> >     economies of scale kick in at n = 2 and thus we don't need anything
> >     more than Plurality in the first place[1].
> >
> >
> > No, because non-competitive candidates still serve a useful purpose even
> > if their odds of winning are low.  And a non-plurality election is
> > harder to game, as illustrated by the GOP's 40-yr use of a nixonian-
> > Southern Strategy of pitting poor whites against minorities when
> > outsiders are given voice to reframe wedge issues that tilt the de facto
> > center away from the true political center.
>
> So you say the non-competitive candidates still serve a purpose. But
> your economics-of-scale argument only considered competitive candidates.
> Call the set of competitive candidates X, and the set of noncompetitive
> candidates "that still matter", Y. Then I could just as easily apply
> your objection so that it argues in favor of advanced methods, too. I
> just say that even if you're right about economics of scale for X, that
> says nothing about the relative size of Y under IRV with respect to Y
> under an advanced method.
>
> The problem with the argument is that it's very hard indeed to construct
> a simple model that considers Plurality inadequate, IRV good enough, and
> the advanced methods wasteful, yet can't also be tuned to either
> consider Plurality adequate or IRV inadequate. The model has to be
> complex or the parameters finely adjusted, and complex models without
> evidence have little value.
>
> >     So one may claim that "important single-winner political elections"
> >     necessarily have economies to scale that make anything beyond
> >     2.5-party rule exceedingly unlikely. But without data, that's claim
> >     isn't worth anything. And without data that can't be explained as
> >     confusing P(multipartyism) with P(multipartyism | political dynamics
> >     given by Plurality), the simpler hypothesis, namely that there is no
> >     such barrier that we know of, holds by default.
> >
> >
> > How about economics?  There exists X a cost of running a competitive
> > campaign.  There exists Y a reward, not per se all economic, for winning
> > a campaign.  There exists P a probability of winning.  P is roughly
> > inversely proportional to the number of competitive candidates, albeit
> > less for the last candidate to decide to compete.  If there exists N
> > likely competitive candidates then if the calculation is k*Y/(N+1)<X
> > holds, w. k<1, for the N+1 candidate, who then chooses not to run, it
> > implies that N>(kY-X)/X.   A better election rule might increase k some,
> > but arguably X will also tend to be higher for the less well-known
> > candidate, regardless of the election rule used.
> >
> > So I agree that the average number of competittive candidates can be
> > increased by the use of a different single-winner election rule, but
> > with limits due to the other aspects of running an election and how a
> > single-winner election tends to discourage too many from putting a lot
> > into running for the office.
>
> Then I set (assume, claim) k high enough that the stability Condorcet
> (etc) provides is worth it. You set k low enough that it isn't, and then
> we sit on each our numbers and claim that our k is right and the other
> one's k is wrong.
>
> Or, I lower X by saying that extreme expense of current US presidential
> elections is caused by Plurality rather than being a prior constraint.
> It might be even more specific: the political dynamics given by United
> States history plus the third-party exclusion of Plurality combine to
> make presidential races extremely expensive. For instance, IIRC, the
> televised debates only include parties that have a chance of winning,
> and parties that don't get into the debates are fighting at a severe
> disadvantage, so it becomes very important to signal from the very start
> that one's own party is viable, which is extremely costly[1].
>
> I could also then point at other nations, either other presidential
> countries making use of runoff (to strengthen the first claim), or other
> presidential countries in general, even those under Plurality (to
> strengthen the second), and say that the expense of presidential
> elections in the US is pretty much unequaled elsewhere in the world.
> That is, I think it is, but I'm not going to investigate in detail
> unless I know you won't pull the "it's different in the US than in every
> one of those other countries" response.
>
> But most likely of all, I'd say: "economics of scale? Please robustly
> show that they exist within politics. Then show that the real world
> parameters are so as to strengthen your position, rather than the
> position of Plurality supporters or of advanced-method supporters".
>
> >     And, if you're not claiming that there is such economics of scale,
> >     but simply that there *might* be, then it's still less risky to
> >     assume multipartyism is right and use an advanced method. If we're
> >     wrong, nothing lost but "momentum". If we're right, we avoid getting
> >     stuck at something that would still seriously misrepresent the
> >     wishes of the people.
> >
> >
> >   Well, I am claiming there exists inherent economies of scale in
> > single-winner elections such that the number of competitive candidates
> > are likely to have a fuzzy ceiling apart from the specific election rule
> > used, and that single-partyism/multipartyism is a function of the mix of
> > single-winner and fair multi-winner election rules used.  My implication
> > of the first is that it relativizes the import of alternative
> > single-winner election rules for political elections and thereby
> > elevates the import of marketing/first-mover advantage in the
> > replacement of FPTP.
>
> Again, without data, there's no reason to set the parameters at your
> sweet spot as opposed to somebody else's sweet spot. So the most
> reasonable approach would be to not claim there is a sweet spot (or
> economics of scale or whatnot) until otherwise can be shown.
>
> ----
>
> [1] And the same dynamic is replicated within the parties out of need to
> be seen as winnable in the general election. For instance, Romney paying
> $1M on TV ads and busing to get his supporters to the Iowa poll in 2007
> can be explained in this context. He had to show himself as winnable to
> win the primaries and in turn have a chance at the general election.
> Warren Smith has made arguments in this direction.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 29 May 2013 13:06:01 -0500
> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] In political elections C (in terms of serious
>         candidates w. an a priori strong chance of election) will never get
>         large!
> Message-ID:
>         <
> CAMyHmncWuLx4+gg-B0JRi1FtbQeqr_OSHjze-AP1o8YeFfJtZA at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:
>
> > On 05/29/2013 12:15 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 4:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> >> <km_elmet at lavabit.com <mailto:km_elmet at lavabit.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >>     On 05/27/2013 09:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
> >>
> >>         Smith's http://rangevoting.org/__**PuzzIgnoredInfo.html<
> http://rangevoting.org/__PuzzIgnoredInfo.html>
> >>
> >>         <http://rangevoting.org/**PuzzIgnoredInfo.html<
> http://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html>
> >> >
> >>
> >>         needs to be taken w. a grain of salt.
> >>
> >>         The short-comings of IRV depend on the likely number of serious
> >>         candidates whose a priori odds of winning, before one assigns
> >>         voter-utilities, are strong.  If real life important
> single-winner
> >>         political elections have economies of scale in running a serious
> >>         election then it's reasonable to expect only 1, 2 or 3 (maybe 4
> >>         once in
> >>         a blue moon) candidates to have a priori, no matter what
> >>         election rule
> >>         gets used, serious chance to win, while the others are at best
> >>         trying to
> >>         move the center on their key issues and at worse potential
> >>         spoilers in a
> >>         fptp election.
> >>
> >>
> >>     That argument is too strong in the sense that it can easily be
> >>     modified to lead to any conclusion you might wish. And it can be
> >>     modified thus because it is too vague.
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Karl, good to hear from you again.  I doubt economies of scale args
> >> are completely flexible and the evidence need not be as rigorously
> >> presented when one is initially communicating ideas.
> >>
> >
> > Who is Karl?
>
>
> My apologies.   I'm not always good w. names.
>
> >
> >
> >      Let me be more precise. You may claim that if there're some
> >>     economies of scale, then it's reasonable to only expect 1, 2 or 3
> >>     viable candidates. But here's a problem. Without any data, you can
> >>     posit that the economies of scale kick in at just the right point to
> >>     make 2.5-party rule inevitable even under Condorcet, say. But
> >>     without any data, I could just as well posit that the economies of
> >>     scale, if any, kick in at n = 1000; or, I could claim that the
> >>     economies of scale kick in at n = 2 and thus we don't need anything
> >>     more than Plurality in the first place[1].
> >>
> >>
> >> No, because non-competitive candidates still serve a useful purpose even
> >> if their odds of winning are low.  And a non-plurality election is
> >> harder to game, as illustrated by the GOP's 40-yr use of a nixonian-
> >> Southern Strategy of pitting poor whites against minorities when
> >> outsiders are given voice to reframe wedge issues that tilt the de facto
> >> center away from the true political center.
> >>
> >
> > So you say the non-competitive candidates still serve a purpose. But your
> > economics-of-scale argument only considered competitive candidates.
>
>
> dlw: Right, because it doesn't take as much to run as a non-competitive
> candidate who draws attention to issue(s) or group(s) of voters...
>
>
> > Call the set of competitive candidates X, and the set of noncompetitive
> > candidates "that still matter", Y. Then I could just as easily apply your
> > objection so that it argues in favor of advanced methods, too. I just say
> > that even if you're right about economics of scale for X, that says
> nothing
> > about the relative size of Y under IRV with respect to Y under an
> advanced
> > method.
> >
>
> dlw: So you're saying not only there'd be a bigger X, but there'd be a more
> bigger Y with a better alternative than IRV???  I will concede that it may
> be true that E[N[X] | non-IRV alternative to FPTP] > E[N[X] | IRV] but I
> don't think the magnitude of the diff would that great due to the economies
> of scale in running a serious campaign in an important single-winner
> election.  Or, I don't swee why E[N[Y]+N[X] | non-IRV] >E[N[Y]+N[X] | IRV],
> though I do believe E[N[Y] | IRV or (most) non-IRV] >> E[N[Y] | FPTP].  A
> candidate in Y with a small but devoted base would still have a good chance
> of her/his base being swing voters with IRV as opposed to another election
> rule..., but not FPTP, unless (s)he tells them to vote strategically prior
> to the election but that is generally not done.
>
> >
> > The problem with the argument is that it's very hard indeed to construct
> a
> > simple model that considers Plurality inadequate, IRV good enough, and
> the
> > advanced methods wasteful, yet can't also be tuned to either consider
> > Plurality adequate or IRV inadequate. The model has to be complex or the
> > parameters finely adjusted, and complex models without evidence have
> little
> > value.
> >
> >
> >      So one may claim that "important single-winner political elections"
> >>     necessarily have economies to scale that make anything beyond
> >>     2.5-party rule exceedingly unlikely. But without data, that's claim
> >>     isn't worth anything. And without data that can't be explained as
> >>     confusing P(multipartyism) with P(multipartyism | political dynamics
> >>     given by Plurality), the simpler hypothesis, namely that there is no
> >>     such barrier that we know of, holds by default.
> >>
> >>
> >> How about economics?  There exists X a cost of running a competitive
> >> campaign.  There exists Y a reward, not per se all economic, for winning
> >> a campaign.  There exists P a probability of winning.  P is roughly
> >> inversely proportional to the number of competitive candidates, albeit
> >> less for the last candidate to decide to compete.  If there exists N
> >> likely competitive candidates then if the calculation is k*Y/(N+1)<X
> >> holds, w. k<1, for the N+1 candidate, who then chooses not to run, it
> >> implies that N>(kY-X)/X.   A better election rule might increase k some,
> >> but arguably X will also tend to be higher for the less well-known
> >> candidate, regardless of the election rule used.
> >>
> >> So I agree that the average number of competittive candidates can be
> >> increased by the use of a different single-winner election rule, but
> >> with limits due to the other aspects of running an election and how a
> >> single-winner election tends to discourage too many from putting a lot
> >> into running for the office.
> >>
> >
> > Then I set (assume, claim) k high enough that the stability Condorcet
> > (etc) provides is worth it. You set k low enough that it isn't, and then
> we
> > sit on each our numbers and claim that our k is right and the other
> one's k
> > is wrong.
> >
>
> dlw: Your point is the need for empirical evidence to constrain k.  You'd
> agree that k is likely bounded by 1, or probably something less than one
> because if the last potentially competitive candidate were more competitive
> then (s)he might more likely induce another candidate to withdraw or dial
> back their campaign?
>
> I would counter that another approach would be to talk to professional
> politicians and/or campaign managers who understand a thing or two about
> electoral methods and get their informed opinions.
>
> >
> > Or, I lower X by saying that extreme expense of current US presidential
> > elections is caused by Plurality rather than being a prior constraint. It
> > might be even more specific: the political dynamics given by United
> States
> > history plus the third-party exclusion of Plurality combine to make
> > presidential races extremely expensive. For instance, IIRC, the televised
> > debates only include parties that have a chance of winning, and parties
> > that don't get into the debates are fighting at a severe disadvantage, so
> > it becomes very important to signal from the very start that one's own
> > party is viable, which is extremely costly[1].
> >
>
> dlw: Agreed that there is a red queen effect and that the system has been
> rigged, possibly not so much out of fear that third party candidates would
> win but that they'd force new issues into the public square and/or make the
> two major parties look bad.  But at the end of the day, there's a large
> population and it's costly to reach that many people, which is why
> Nader-types hopes were more to get the Democratic party to move to the
> left.
>
> But this is kind of besides the point, since the mean number of competitive
> candidates in the US has been less than 2 and we're talking about whether
> it could get considerably higher with serious institutional changes and a
> better electoral rule.  I agree there's likely considerable scope for
> increasing E[N[Y]] and that this would be a very good thing.  The natural
> scope for increasing E[N[X]] is what we disagree on and this does matter
> for the relative value between IRV and non-IRV as improvements over FPTP.
>
>
> > I could also then point at other nations, either other presidential
> > countries making use of runoff (to strengthen the first claim), or other
> > presidential countries in general, even those under Plurality (to
> > strengthen the second), and say that the expense of presidential
> elections
> > in the US is pretty much unequaled elsewhere in the world. That is, I
> think
> > it is, but I'm not going to investigate in detail unless I know you won't
> > pull the "it's different in the US than in every one of those other
> > countries" response.
> >
>
> dlw: I'm not sure I'm tracking which are your two different claims.
>
> As you know, I believe runoff elections are not pure single-winner
> elections, since the first stage is a multi-winner election.  And so some
> of our diffs come from a different taxonomy for election rules.
>
> Also, I don't want to conflate this debate over the number of competitive
> candidates with the other debate about a two-party (or one-party) dominated
> system vs a multi-party system.  The competitive candidates can be from the
> same party, since there are different factions within parties, especially
> in a two-party dominated system.
>
> >
> > But most likely of all, I'd say: "economics of scale? Please robustly
> show
> > that they exist within politics. Then show that the real world parameters
> > are so as to strengthen your position, rather than the position of
> > Plurality supporters or of advanced-method supporters".
>
>
> dlw: I don't know what you mean by "robustly".  Probably something with
> extensive data and or surveys of candidates/campaign managers?
> It's easy to put the burden of proof on others and given the lack of use of
> "advanced-methods"  in serious political elections, there's no real
> evidence.
>
> My position is that even if the economies of scale are manipulated by the
> use of FPTP and other tricks and what-not, that doesn't mean there wouldn't
> still remain economies of scale in trying to win a non-runoff single-winner
> election with a large number of voters.  This doesn't deny the need for
> electoral reform, it just mitigates the vaunted value-added of
> "advanced-methods" over IRV.
>
> >
> >
> >      And, if you're not claiming that there is such economics of scale,
> >>     but simply that there *might* be, then it's still less risky to
> >>     assume multipartyism is right and use an advanced method. If we're
> >>     wrong, nothing lost but "momentum". If we're right, we avoid getting
> >>     stuck at something that would still seriously misrepresent the
> >>     wishes of the people.
> >>
> >>
> >>   Well, I am claiming there exists inherent economies of scale in
> >> single-winner elections such that the number of competitive candidates
> >> are likely to have a fuzzy ceiling apart from the specific election rule
> >> used, and that single-partyism/multipartyism is a function of the mix of
> >> single-winner and fair multi-winner election rules used.  My implication
> >> of the first is that it relativizes the import of alternative
> >> single-winner election rules for political elections and thereby
> >> elevates the import of marketing/first-mover advantage in the
> >> replacement of FPTP.
> >>
> >
> > Again, without data, there's no reason to set the parameters at your
> sweet
> > spot as opposed to somebody else's sweet spot. So the most reasonable
> > approach would be to not claim there is a sweet spot (or economics of
> scale
> > or whatnot) until otherwise can be shown.
> >
>
> dlw: Or the reasonable approach is to allow for different priors in the
> absence of evidence and to attribute our support for IRV vs non-IRV to our
> different priors.  My view is that the quality of the candidates in X is
> likely to be improved more on than the expected number of candidates in X.
>
>
> >
> > ----
> >
> > [1] And the same dynamic is replicated within the parties out of need to
> > be seen as winnable in the general election. For instance, Romney paying
> > $1M on TV ads and busing to get his supporters to the Iowa poll in 2007
> can
> > be explained in this context. He had to show himself as winnable to win
> the
> > primaries and in turn have a chance at the general election. Warren Smith
> > has made arguments in this direction.
> >
>
> I agree that FPTP exacerbates the economies of scale.   IRV alone won't
> undo all of that, but it'd make it easier since candidates in Y who could
> be upgraded to X won't be as threatening to candidates in X.
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20130529/e73c4035/attachment.htm
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Election-Methods mailing list
> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
>
> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 107, Issue 18
> *************************************************
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20130529/647252b6/attachment-0003.htm>