[EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Jun 24 17:52:02 PDT 2013
> De : Benjamin Grant
>Cc : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 17h53
>Objet : Re: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?
>The only way to avoid this, I *think*, is with a system in which expressing a preference of A over B doesn't let C win - and such a system may well have worse flaws, possibly.
Right, you are here so close to IIA that you'd be stuck with random ballot or similar. FBC is sort of a "next best." It's very close in spirit, only you're guaranteed to be able to vote A top and equal to B, but not necessarily strictly higher. Otherwise, we might create conflicting entitlements.
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