[EM] MAV on electowiki

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Tue Jun 18 21:01:18 PDT 2013

I've reworked the description. See what you think.

2013/6/18 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 04:25 PM 6/18/2013, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> I quickly read the article. Here are some observations.
>> - Term "Bucklin system" has not been defined. I can guess that it
>> probably refers to Bucklin style stepwise addition of new approvals, but
>> that may not be as obvious to all readers. If there is no definition of
>> "Bucklin system", maybe one could say "As in Bucklin" instead of "As with
>> any Bucklin system".
> There is a link to Bucklin voting in the article.
>  - Sentence "if there are more than one with a majority, the "B" votes are
>> removed and the highest sub-majority wins" is ambigious in the sense that
>> it is not clear if "highest sub-majority" refers to all candidates or to
>> candidates that had majority after adding the "B" votes.
> It's poorly worded, all right. Minor point: "There are more than one"
> grates. (I find the use of the singular or plural with "more" to be
> ambiguous. I'd avoid it.)
> An example is given when the principle has not been stated.
> The method does not make sense as stated. The "back-up" is a tie-breaker,
> considering multiple majorities as if they were ties. They *are* ties in
> median vote. The tie-breaker only selects a member of the tied set.
> Something went south. What was proposed was a Bucklin system. Bucklin does
> use, I've suggested, a range ballot, but the way that it does this is with
> a ranked structure. I ran into this when trying to design a set of votes to
> show a problem that I have not seen examined.
> The description on the wiki page makes the system seem more complex than
> it is.
> It's been designed to be five-rank, with explicit F. That's a fish
> bicycle. "No support" means merely "no support." No vote. Introducing the D
> vote is a later possible reform, it is an unapproved category. It makes the
> ballot considerably more complex, and the explanation is more complex.
>  *D: Oppose unless there are no other majorities at all.
> Is that clear? I don't think so. Bucklin as Approval Voting doesn't have a
> "disapproved rank." All blanks are disapproved.
>  - It is not quite clear what happens and if it is possible that there is
>> no majority after the "F" votes have been counted.
> The F votes are never counted, first of all. Listing them is a mistake.
> (If the F votes continued the amalgamation, then someone would be voting
> *for* a candidate rated F. That was the intention for the D rating.
> It is far better, however, to introduce a D rating in combination with a
> runoff system, where the D rating could improve runoff candidate selection.
> When a voter rates a candidate as "D", they are opposing the election of
> that candidate.
> The Bucklin system required amalgamating three ranks. It's looking like
> MAV requires five, but that could be reduced to four, but the whole idea
> here was to have a *simple* next step beyond basic Approval Voting, and, as
> well, a clear similar method for use in a runoff system.
> (We basically need a step up from approval as a plurality method, and from
> approval as a primary method in a runoff system.)
>  - The grades could be letters or numbers, but they could also be e.g.
>> columns without any letter or number. This part of text discusses what the
>> ballots might look like. I'm not sure if ballot different ballot formats
>> should be seen as an essential part of the method definition, or if the
>> method should be defined abstractly without referring to what the actual
>> ballots might look like. I tend to define the methods abstractly without
>> assuming anything on the ballots, and then discuss possible ballot formats
>> as a separate topic, but I'm not saying that's the only and best approach.
>> The current text is thus ok. I just first read the grades of the definition
>> as abstract grades, not as definitions on what would be written in the
>> ballots.
> *Something* should be on the ballot that expresses the *function* of a
> vote. Jameson took this concept from me. A voter should be able to see the
> ballot and have a reasonably clear idea, just from it, what the vote
> *means* ... and the meaning is the *effect* that the vote causes.
> The original Bucklin ballot, however, simply instructed voters to mark
> "1st choice," "2nd choice," or '3rd choice." The googlebooks copy is
> unclear, http://books.google.com/books?**id=QcIqAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA1-PA757&**
> dq=The+Grand+Junction+plan+of+**city+government+and+its+**
> results&hl=en&ei=**uOTdS7aFKMKclgfq9739Cg&sa=X&**oi=book_result&ct=result&
> **resnum=3&ved=0CDsQ6AEwAg#v=**onepage&q=The%20Grand%**
> 20Junction%20plan%20of%20city%**20government%20and%20its%**
> 20results&f=false<http://books.google.com/books?id=QcIqAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA1-PA757&dq=The+Grand+Junction+plan+of+city+government+and+its+results&hl=en&ei=uOTdS7aFKMKclgfq9739Cg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDsQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=The%20Grand%20Junction%20plan%20of%20city%20government%20and%20its%20results&f=false>
> Page 95. It looks like they actually instructed people to vote for all but
> one. But that part is quite unclear. In the first set of instructions, at
> the top of the ballot, they did suggest not voting for one candidate. There
> may be another copy of this ballot somewhere. Bucklin was widely covered.
> MAV *assumes that voters err if they approve two candidates by a
> majority.* That's why it backs up. But what, indeed, if it backs up and the
> multiple majority candidates are not the plurality winner in the previous
> round? What if there are *no* votes for those candidates in that round, or
> the vote is small.
> It said: "
>  - The linked definition of "evaluatve" says that ranked systems can not
>> give same ratings to two candidates. I think that's confusing and wrong.
>> Juho
> Well, that's a common assumption of "ranked systems." It's essentially a
> definition, which is why we have said that Bucklin is *not* a ranked
> system. But, really, it's a ranked system that allows equal ranking.
> (Original Bucklin allowed equal ranking in the third rank only. We have
> simple expanded the approval principle to all ranks. *That is a convenience
> to voters.*)
> ----
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