[EM] Absolutely new here

[Jameson Quinn]

2013/6/16 Benjamin Grant <benn at 4efix.com>

> Let me put forth (better, I hope) a more complete thought (which is
> probably one of those Bucklin Variants, as it turns out.)****
>
> ** **
>
> The ballot has every candidate on it.  In order to be considered valid,
> each voter must rank each and every one of them.  So with five candidates,
> a valid ballot might look like: 1st:B/2nd:D/3rd:A/4th:E/5th:C  No
> duplicates, no skipping.****
>
> ** **
>
> Then we create a threshold of just over 50% of the number of votes.  If
> 100 people vote, then 51 is the threshold.****
>
> ** **
>
> We then look at only the 1st place votes.  If anyone hit the threshold,
> they win if they are the only one.  If more than one candidate hit the
> threshold, the one that surpasses the threshold by more wins.****
>
> ** **
>
> If no one yet hits the threshold, add in all the 2nd place votes, and
> check again. If still no one hits the threshold, add in the 3rd place
> votes, and so on.
>

What you're describing is a basically generic ranked Bucklin method. The
completion method ("tiebreaker") you've described is the one used by most
implementations of Bucklin in the progressive era; though most (or all?) of
them were less hard-nosed in requiring full, strict ranking.

A minor point: since some modern Bucklin systems use the letters A-F for
grades, it's probably less confusing to pull candidate designations from
the end of the alphabet (eg V-Z in your case).

> ****
>
> ** **
>
> It was a thought experiment I was doing, I’m not at all sure, for example,
> that it might not be better to permit duplicates or skipping.  I obviously
> need to go deeper.
>

As far as I know, everyone who seriously advocates a Bucklin-type method
today has reached that conclusion: that duplicates and skipping (that is, a
rated or graded rather than ranked method) are a good idea. It allows the
voter to think in more absolute rather than comparative terms, which is
computationally / cognitively simpler; and as a purely practical matter, it
would reduce the incidence of spoiled ballots.


> ****
>
> ** **
>
> I think my next task is to put a pause in the pursuit of different voting
> systems to focus on understanding better the various criteria (later no
> harm, Condorcet, etc), in much more depth, ie, what they are each about,
> what it means that a system fulfills of fails one, etc.****
>
> ** **
>
> I will post more about that shortly – let me know if I am dragging this
> group to far into “voting theory kindergarten”, but I really want to “get”
> all this.
>

By no means is it a problem. On the contrary, it's healthy for the list to
go over the basics once in a while.

Thanks,
Jameson

> ****
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks.****
>
> ** **
>
> -Benn Grant****
>
> eFix Computer Consulting****
>
> benn at 4efix.com****
>
> 603.283.6601****
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.quinn at gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Sunday, June 16, 2013 11:20 AM
> *To:* Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> *Cc:* Benjamin Grant; election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> *Subject:* Re: [EM] Absolutely new here****
>
> ** **
>
> As one of the principal advocates for Bucklin systems on this list, I
> thought I'd expand a bit on Kristofer's excellent response.****
>
> 2013/6/16 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>****
>
> On 06/16/2013 05:26 AM, Benjamin Grant wrote:****
>
> [...IRV discussion...]****
>
>
> [...good response...]****
>
> 2)I haven’t seen a voting system like this – what are the issues with
> it? Upsides and downsides?
>
> A)Each voter ranks their choices on their ballots, first through last
> place.
>
> B)If one candidate got a majority of 1^st place votes, they win. If not,**
> **
>
>
> the second place votes are added. If still no majority he third place
> votes are added, and so on, until one candidate has a majority.
>
> Would the above system work?****
>
>
> That's Bucklin. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucklin_voting . It's one of
> the few ranked methods that have been used in political elections in the
> United States, and it has a connection to median rating (which elects the
> candidate with highest median rating or grade).
>
> It would work, but the rating variant is better. In the context of
> ranking, Bucklin fails Condorcet, for instance.****
>
> ** **
>
> In case it wasn't clear, by "rating", Kristofer means a system with a
> fixed number of levels of support/opposition (typically 3-7), where voters
> can any number (including 0) of candidates at a given level. Ranking means
> that voters must give a strict ordering of candidates, with no ties or
> skipped ranks.****
>
>
> It also has some bullet-voting incentive. ****
>
> ** **
>
> In this case, "It" refers to the ranked version only.****
>
>  ****
>
> Say that you support candidate A. You're reasonably sure it will get quite
> a number of second-place votes. Then even though you might prefer B to A,
> it's strategically an advantage to rank A first, because then the method
> will detect a majority for A sooner.
>
> One of the points of the graded/rated variants is to encourage the voters
> to think in absolute terms ("is this candidate good enough to deserve an
> A") rather than relative terms ("is this candidate better than that
> candidate"). If they do, then the method becomes more robust.****
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks.****
>
> ** **
>
> One think Kristofer didn't mention is that your definition wasn't quite
> complete. What happens if two candidates attain a majority at the same
> rank, or (in rated versions or due to truncation) no candidate attains a
> majority without including the bottom support level? Resolving this issue
> requires a Bucklin completion method, just as resolving cyclical
> preferences in Condorcet requires a Condorcet completion method.
> Colloquially, Bucklin completion methods are often called "Bucklin
> tiebreakers".****
>
> ** **
>
> Thus, there are many possible Bucklin systems, including "ER-Bucklin"
> (which majority is highest?), "Majority Judgment" (remove an equal number
> of ballots at the pivotal/median rating for each candidate until one of
> them gets a majority at a higher or lower rating), "Graduated Majority
> Judgment" (find the candidate who needs the lowest percentage of their
> ballots at the pivotal/median rating to attain a majority; also expressable
> as a simple algebraic formula that gives a non-integer score to each
> candidate), and the as-yet-unnamed method currently being discussed (for
> instance) here<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-June/031877.html>and
> here<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-June/031880.html> (find
> the candidate with the greatest number of above-median votes). I'd
> appreciate it if you read the posts linked above and responded with your
> own opinion as to naming.****
>
> ** **
>
> Supporters of Bucklin methods (like me) typically speak of the following
> advantages:****
>
>    - Voters can express, and the system can respond to, varying levels of
>    support. Score voting (aka Range voting) is even better in this regard, but
>    Bucklin systems are still better than most others.****
>    - In many cases, an "honest" (scaled utility) vote is strategically
>    optimal. For instance, say the rating categories were the letter grades
>    A-F, and the two frontrunner candidates both had a median of "C". A voter
>    who had given one of those two a "B" and the other one a "D" would have
>    cast a full-power vote, and would not need to regret not having given those
>    candidates an "A" and an "F". This contrasts with Score Voting, where in
>    general only approval-style votes (all top- and bottom-rating) are
>    strategically optimal. The hope is that by leaving more room for honest
>    voting, Bucklin systems will get better information from voters, allowing a
>    better result.****
>
> Welcome to the list, and we hope to hear more from you,****
>
> Jameson****
>
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