[EM] Proposed bullet-voting prohibition criterion

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Wed Jan 30 14:21:27 PST 2013


Proposed bullet-voting prohibition criterion
"a method that passes only
LNHelp encourages bullet-voting"

Nonsense. Failing LNHe can and often will strategically force a voter
to rank all the candidates, in order to help one or a few at the top
of the ranking. And if the voter doesn't have any preference among hir
bottom choices, then s/he has strategic incentive or need to randomly
rank them all.

Most here agree that that isn't desirable.

For instance, the LNHe failure of such traditional unimproved
Condorcet (TUC) methods, such as Beatpath, Ranked-Pairs, etc. is
admitted by most to be a disadvantage.

It's one thing for voters to have some incentive to rank all the
candidates, if they want to choose among them all, but it's quite
another thing to make it necessary to rank candidates in order to help
the chances of higher-ranked candidates. That's what LNHe failure is,
and pretty much everyone agrees that it isn't desirable.

LNHe doesn't encourage bullet-voting, it merely doesn't strategically
force voting for candidates you don't like. As I mentioned, IRV, which
passes LNHe, still gives incentive to rank all the candidates, if they
have any merit-differences at all, because when set S is eliminated,
then you might as well help the better members of not-S against the
worse members of not-S.

(But I nevertheless wouldn't rank Democrats in IRV, because I don't
want the aesthetic disgrace of doing so)

Mike Ossipoff



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