[EM] The usable interpretation of Jameson's proposed Strong IIAC

[Jameson Quinn]

2013/1/9 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>

> Strong IIAC:
> -----------------
>
> Premise:
>
> An election is held. Everyone votes so as to maximize their utility
> expectation, based on their utility-valuations of the candidates, and
> their estimates or perceptions of any relevant probabilities regarding
> how people will vote, or of count-occurrences such as particular
> pair-ties.
>
> After the election is counted, and the winner recorded, but before any
> results are announced to anyone other than the counters, one of the
> candidates, who isn't the winner, is hit and killed by a car. Because
> a different candidate-set could cause people to vote differently, a
> new election is held.
>
> Again, people vote so as to maximize their expectation, as described
> in the first paragraph.
>
> Requirement;
>
> The winner of the 2nd election must be the same as the winner of the
> 1st election.
>
> [end of Strong IIAC definition]
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> If it sounds as if it would be difficult to determine whether a method
> meets that criterion, then I remind you that the example-writer is
> free to devise _any_ example that complies with the criterion's
> premise. The example-writer can choose a simple but extreme example
> with particularly extreme or simplified utilities and probability
> perceptions.
>
> I suggest that you'll find that no non-probabilistic and
> non-dictatorial method can meet Strong IIAC, as defined above.
>

I agree. However, they will break it with different probabilities, given a
universe of scenarios. For a realistic universe, I suggest MJ will break it
less often than Approval or Score.

I realize that the above claim is unsubstantiated. But note that I above
agree with an unsubstantiated claim. As I said in my prior message, instead
of simply pointing out that claims are unsubstantiated, we'll get a lot
further if you also say how plausible and relevant you find them.
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