[EM] proportional constraints - help needed

[Peter Zbornik]

No, only one election, please, no meta-elections. Two elections would
take too much time.
Thanks for your understanding.

PZ

2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>:
> On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik <pzbornik at gmail.com <mailto:pzbornik at gmail.com>>
>>
>>
>>     Jameson,
>>
>>     I am not sure if we understand each other here.
>>     I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives
>>     (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender.
>>     If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the
>>     quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed,
>>     for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in
>>     candidates at places 2 and 5.
>>
>>
>> OK. I was responding to your initial statement of the problem, without
>> this additional proportionally-quoting-in constraint.
>>
>> The issue with this constraint is that it is only meaningful if the
>> electorate is meaningfully separable into parties. If, on the other
>> hand, the electorate is in a 2D issue space, it's hard to see exactly
>> what this constraint even means. Thus I suspect no non-partisan system
>> can be made to fit this constraint. I could easily see how to meet this
>> constraint with a party list system (preferably open, because closed
>> list systems are bad), and possibly I could work it out with a
>> pseudo-list system like PAL, but with STV it looks to me like an
>> impossible task.
>
>
> With a council size of 5, it might be possible to do an election between all
> consistent sets. The general idea would be something to the effect of that
> you first use a proportional ordering, setting constraints at different
> places (force woman at position one, position two, etc). Then you find all
> the sets the proportional ordering produces, and you hold a supermajority
> election to decide which to use.
>
> The supermajority election could be a parliamentary procedures one if the
> number of members is small, otherwise it would have to be by means of an
> election method (or Asset/liquid democracy). I say it'd have to be
> supermajority so that the majority can't force disproportionality on the
> minority. However, a consensus election might on the other hand give undue
> power to the minority. So that leads to another problem, which is similar to
> the question of how to get a proportionally represented council if the only
> thing you can do is ask the voters to rank the different councils.
>
> Simmons had some ideas relating to lotteries in that respect, if I'm not
> mistaken. I don't remember the details, though. Could they be applied here?
>