# [EM] proportional constraints - help needed

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at lavabit.com
Tue Feb 5 11:36:06 PST 2013

```On 02/05/2013 06:50 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
> The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows:
> We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like
> Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using
> the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hagenbach-Bischoff_quota) under the
> following constraints:
> Constraint 1: One of the first two seats has to go to a man and the
> other seat has to go to a woman.
> Constraint 2: One of seat three, four and five has to go to a man and
> one of those seats has to go to a woman.
> Say the "default" proportional ranking method elects women to all five
> seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to
> satisfy the constraints.

Oh, sorry. I didn't see the part about that you could use a proportional
ranking method. In that case, the answer's simple. Pick the highest
ranked council extension that doesn't violate the constraints.

E.g. for Schulze's proportional ranking method, say the candidates are
W1, W2, W3, M1, M2, M3 (for Woman and Man respectively).

First round, you have a matrix with W1, W2, W3, M1, M2, and M3. Say the
Schulze winner is M1. That's okay, M1 gets first place.

Second round, you have a matrix with {M1, W1}, {M1, W2}, {M1, W3}, {M1,
M2}, and {M1, M3}. Determine the Schulze social ordering according to
the Schulze proportional ordering weights (as defined in his paper).
Remove {M1, M2} and {M1, M3} from the output social ordering since these
aren't permitted. Say {M1, W1} wins.

Then you just continue like that. In essence, you're picking the best
continuation of the ordering given what the constraints force you to do.

You could also just null out the defeat strengths in the proportional
ordering matrix, but that would produce strategy incentives since
Schulze doesn't satisfy IIA.

```