[EM] Clone-Independence and Condorcet compliance

[Michael Ossipoff]

[quote]
V_A>B is the number of ballots that rank A above B.
V_A is the number of ballots that rank A at the top.
S_A = sum_B M_AB V_B is the score for
>* candidate A. *
**
 M_AB can be any antisymmetric function of V_A>B and V_B>A that is positive
if V_A>B > V_B>A.
examples:
M_AB = V_A>B - V_B>A
M_AB = (V_A>B - V_B>A)/(V_A>B + V_B>A)
M_AB = sign(V_A>B - V_A<B)

Eliminate the candidate with lowest score.  Recalculate V_A's and S_A's.
Repeat until one candidate remains
[endquote]

But, when introducing, proposing or advocating a method, it's necessary to
tell the _rationale_. What problem is solved, or what goal is met, or what
purpose is served by compliance with Clone-Independence and the Condorcet
Criterion?

What is it that identifies the combination of Clone-Independence and the
Condorcet Criterion as the basis for choosing evaluating or choosing a
method?

I claim that, under current conditions, a method must meet FBC in order to
be adequate.

Current conditions consist of 1) A disinformational media system that
promote the belief that only the Democrat or Republican can win, and that
therefore corruption is unavoidable,and that therefore corruption is
acceptable; and 2) A public who believe that, and who believe that the
election of the Republican would be an unprecedented disaster.

Under current conditions, FBC-failing methods typically or always, for
Progressive>Democrat>Republican voters, have an optimal strategy of voting
the Democrat over everyone else.

Approval and Score are the familiar and simple, and most
enactable, FBC-complying methods.

Regarding Green scenario conditions, I've said a lot about the benefits of
the powerful combination of MMC and CD, possessed by IRV and Condorcet-IRV
(CIRV).

Michael Ossipoff
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