[EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 04/04/2013 09:31 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 12:12 PM 4/4/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> On 04/04/2013 08:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>> At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>>> However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
>>>> called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
>>>> http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems to
>>>> be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really
>>>> understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used to
>>>> also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
>>>
>>> Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. Now,
>>> why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules
>>> elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no
>>> eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter
>>> preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by
>>> agreement?
>>
>> Not as I understood the description. Ordinary (not Extended) Hay
>> voting consists of voters submitting the rated ballots, and the Hay
>> method probabilistically picks a candidate. The method is designed so
>> that the optimal thing to do is for each voter to report ratings
>> proportional to their real utilities.
>>
>> The "multiple" rounds of Extended Hay (again, if I understood it
>> right) don't actually happen. They're like the multiple rounds of IRV:
>> the algorithm goes through multiple stages, between which the
>> effective ratings change according to the logic of the algorithm
>> itself, but each voter only has to submit a single ballot.
>>
>> Thus, I don't think your comments about organizational unity and
>> deliberation apply to this method. And yes, repeated ballot may be
>> more effective than single ballot, but that's not what extended Hay is
>> about.
>
> Okay -- the pages were not explicit about this. Is there a simple
> description of Hay Voting?

See here: http://www.spaceandgames.com/?p=8

It's more of a post of everything that led to the logic of Hay voting in 
the first place. Warren also has described it, and his comments in his 
IEVS voting program say:

"Probability of election proportional to sum of squared roots of 
normalized utilities."

As for why this works, see the URL. (Though it appears the mathematical 
symbols on that page aren't rendering properly on my end. I hope this is 
just a client problem.)

I also think of Extended Hay as something more like the Chicago pile 
than a practical reactor. It's completely impractical, but if it works, 
it may give some ideas on how to make something that also works and 
isn't so impractical. In that sense, it's like my (weakly) monotone 
Bucklin multiwinner method, which also is very complex, but manages 
something no other Droop-proportional multiwinner method I'm aware of does.

> However, the obvious complexity could be a fatal flaw in itself. The
> impact of "strategic voting" on Range has been vastly overstated, if the
> Range resolution is adequate. Such voting has a limited impact, because
> Range never encourages preference reversal. Some have claimed that
> optimal range voting will suppress preferences; my own opinion is that
> this will happen to a much lesser degree than some expect.

Then how does that explain Youtube ratings going to min-max to such an 
extent that they replaced Range (star ratings) with Approval (thumbs 
up/down)?

(I'm curious. One possible explanation is of course that the change 
didn't arise from min-maxing, but the impression I got was that there 
was quite a bit of min-maxing going on before the change to Approval-style.)

> The gain from  bumping up a candidate a single rating to make it equal,
> in Range of sufficient resolution, when one actually has a preference,
 > is small,
> and the satisfaction of actually expressing true preference is high.
> We overthink how much people want to "win" elections.

I doubt you'd get intermediate strategy in Range. You'd either have 
Approval strategy or not, at least among the serious contenders.

But hopefully, Jameson's experimental data will shed some light on how 
much strategy you'd get in the various methods, and of what kind. Then 
we don't have to think as much about what seems intuitive that the 
voters would do.