[EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 12:12 PM 4/4/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>On 04/04/2013 08:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>>However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
>>>called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
>>>http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems to
>>>be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really
>>>understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used to
>>>also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
>>
>>Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. Now,
>>why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules
>>elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no
>>eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter
>>preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by
>>agreement?
>
>Not as I understood the description. Ordinary (not Extended) Hay 
>voting consists of voters submitting the rated ballots, and the Hay 
>method probabilistically picks a candidate. The method is designed 
>so that the optimal thing to do is for each voter to report ratings 
>proportional to their real utilities.
>
>The "multiple" rounds of Extended Hay (again, if I understood it 
>right) don't actually happen. They're like the multiple rounds of 
>IRV: the algorithm goes through multiple stages, between which the 
>effective ratings change according to the logic of the algorithm 
>itself, but each voter only has to submit a single ballot.
>
>Thus, I don't think your comments about organizational unity and 
>deliberation apply to this method. And yes, repeated ballot may be 
>more effective than single ballot, but that's not what extended Hay is about.

Okay -- the pages were not explicit about this. Is there a simple 
description of Hay Voting?

However, the obvious complexity could be a fatal flaw in itself. The 
impact of "strategic voting" on Range has been vastly overstated, if 
the Range resolution is adequate. Such voting has a limited impact, 
because Range never encourages preference reversal. Some have claimed 
that optimal range voting will suppress preferences; my own opinion 
is that this will happen to a much lesser degree than some expect. 
The gain from bumping up a candidate a single rating to make it 
equal, in Range of sufficient resolution, when one actually has a 
preference, is small, and the satisfaction of actually expressing 
true preference is high. We overthink how much people want to "win" elections.

(To be sure, we need systems where everyone wins. With Asset, there 
is no incentive at all to vote for anyone other than your settled 
favorite. I'd allow multiple votes, with them being fractionated, 
because Asset wastes no votes, but only to avoid tossing ballots from 
overvoting, or to help out a voter who really has trouble 
distinguishing between two or more favorites. Asset has no losers, 
only winners, as chosen, and in direct/representative Asset, where 
electors may have an Assembly vote -- but not deliberative rights 
directly -- that's absolute. And voters will know this and see this. 
Their vote counts.)