[EM] Amateur peer-reviewed "journal" for voting methods, criteria, and compliances?

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at lavabit.com
Sun Sep 30 04:56:52 PDT 2012

On 09/30/2012 08:16 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

> i dunno exactly how they do their ordering at Wikipedia (to get 2nd, 3rd
> place winners using Schulze), but would you say if the Condorcet
> criterion was met for each subset, would it be unfair to just identify
> the top CW, then kick him/her out of the set of candidates and do it
> again to identify the CW in the remaining set? it seems logical to me to
> say that after the top CW is removed from the candidate set, that if a
> CW exists in the remaining set, wouldn't that be fair to call the
> "2nd-most popular" candidate?

The problem with this is that it amplifies a (bare) majority into 
unanimity. Say you have an election like:

51: R1 > R2 > R3 > D1 > D2 > D3
49: D1 > D2 > D3 > R1 > R2 > R3

then R1 is the Condorcet winner. Remove R1, and R2 is the Condorcet 
winner. Remove both R1 and R2, and R3 is the CW. So if you pick three 
winners, the bare majority's R-preference gets amplified into an 
unanimity of every choice elected.

For a similar reason, a runoff between the first two candidates in a 
Condorcet social ordering could easily be uninteresting. However, at 
least in the situation above, the social ordering would make a good line 
of succession order; it could also be used for picking president and 
vice president.

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