[EM] Amateur peer-reviewed "journal" for voting methods, criteria, and compliances?

[Michael Ossipoff]

The journal project sounds better as Adrian proposed it.

Jameson: I'm not sure about the wisdom of just dealing with what we
agree on--criterion-compliances and equivalences,
compiance-implication relationships among criteria. Hasn't that mostly
been done anyway? You spoke of all the many methods that haven't been
evaluated by all of the many criteria. But surely only the methods
actually being advocated need be looked at in terms of their criterion
compliances. And not by all criteria either. Only by the ones that
someone is advocating as important.

What we _don't_ agree on is the importance of the various different
properties that can be asked of voting systems. That's the important
thing that hasn't been done, on which zero progress has been made.
Want to do something new and valuable? Evaluating the criteria,
inviting people to justify the criteria that they advocate--that would
be something new and valuable.

For that matter, there's no need to wait for a new website (though I'm
in favor of Democracy Chronicles hosting Jameson's journal project).

I mean, there's no need to wait till that's set up, before the
criteria's importance is discussed. If you want to discuss something
important, than right now start a discussion about how we justify the
properties that we claim are desirable, important, or necessary for
voting systems.

That's what would turn  a cacophony into a discussion.

I've told why I consider FBC to be important. It's available in
Approval, Score, and Symmetrical ICT.

 Later-No-Help simplifies bottom-end strategy, and is available in
Approval, Score, and Symmetrical ICT.

Though the chicken dilemma is only a nuisance, one that can be dealt
with, in Approval and Score, it can be easily gotten rid of, in a rank
method.
Because the chicken dilemma is the nearest thing to a "problem" for
Approval, I suggest that any method claimed to improve on Approval
must be one that gets rid of the chicken dilemma.

So I claim that these properties listed below are important:

=================================================
A) For any method:

FBC,

Later-No-Help
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
B) For a rank method (to justify using a rank method):

No chicken dilemma

And to fully justify rank-balloting:

Condorcet's Criterion (preferably legitimately-defined)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C)  Available in Approval & Score, and very much justified as "how it
should be", on the grounds that it sounds a bit nonsensical to violate
these:

Mono-Add-Top
Participation
Consistency
IIAC
Bristow's "Pairwise-Social-Choice" criterion
.......(If more people vote X>Y than Y>X, then don't elect Y)


===================================================

Approval and Score have all of the above-listed properties except for group B..

I've read that Majority Judgment fails Participation and Consistency.
Majority Judgment shares the chicken dilemma with Approval and Score.

Condorcet methods don't meet the group C criteria.

Symmetrical ICT has all of the above-listed properties, except for group C.

===================================================

Which of the above-listed properties are had by Beatpath,
Ranked-Pairs, or VoteFair? None?

===================================================

I don't consider the group C criteria to be necessary, but it makes
more sense to meet them than to fail them.

Mike Ossipoff