[EM] Juho: I agree to disagree
Michael Ossipoff
email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Sep 28 11:12:22 PDT 2012
I'd said:
>>> But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on
>>> EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due
>>> to the innumerable different methods advocated by rank-method
>>> advocates, who will never be able to agree on one; and due to the
>>> innumerable criteria by which they "justify" their favorite methods.
>>>
Bristow said:
> i can live with one basic criterion:
>
> if more voters agree that Candidate A is a better choice than Candidate B
> than the number of voters that prefer B, then if at all possible, let's not
> elect Candidate B.
>
> simple, and hard to argue with.
>
> but i know that Mike will argue with it.
I don't argue with it.
I wouldn't argue with a criterion unless it were incompatible with
properties that I consider necessary or important.
My only proposals for official public elections are Approval, and maybe Score.
Some of their properties:
They meet FBC, Later-No-Help, Mono-Add-Top, Participation,
Mono-Add-Plump, Monotonicity, Consistency, IIAC, Voted-Majority, and
Pareto.
The 1st 4 of those criteria aren't met by many methods.
Some of the others, such as Pareto, Monotonicity and Voted-Majority
are met by many methods. I don't consider IIAC to be necessary, but it
still makes sense and has some desirability.
So Bristow's criterion is compatible with the most important
properties, and with the only methods that I advocate for official
public elections.
Though Approval and Score meet that criterion, all Condorcet methods
fail that criterion.
Mike Ossipoff
>
> --
>
> r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list