[EM] Juho: I agree to disagree

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Sep 28 11:12:22 PDT 2012


I'd said:

>>> But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on
>>> EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due
>>> to the innumerable different methods advocated by rank-method
>>> advocates, who will never be able to agree on one; and due to the
>>> innumerable criteria by which they "justify" their favorite methods.
>>>

Bristow said:

> i can live with one basic criterion:
>
> if more voters agree that Candidate A is a better choice than Candidate B
> than the number of voters that prefer B, then if at all possible, let's not
> elect Candidate B.
>
> simple, and hard to argue with.
>
> but i know that Mike will argue with it.

I don't argue with it.

I wouldn't argue with a criterion unless it were incompatible with
properties that I consider necessary or important.

My only proposals for official public elections are Approval, and maybe Score.

Some of their properties:

They meet FBC, Later-No-Help, Mono-Add-Top, Participation,
Mono-Add-Plump, Monotonicity, Consistency, IIAC, Voted-Majority, and
Pareto.

The 1st 4 of those criteria aren't met by many methods.

Some of the others, such as Pareto, Monotonicity and Voted-Majority
are met by many methods. I don't consider IIAC to be necessary, but it
still makes sense and has some desirability.

So Bristow's criterion is compatible with the most important
properties, and with the only methods that I advocate for official
public elections.

Though Approval and Score meet that criterion, all Condorcet methods
fail that criterion.

Mike Ossipoff








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