[EM] Scoring (was Re: OpenSTV 2.1.0 released)

[Juho Laatu]

We are about to dive into the details of some methods. I'm not sure if there are still some unanswered questions that I should cover, or my own claims that I did not clarify yet. I'll comment some random points below.

On 22.9.2012, at 1.48, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> Maybe you meant to compare unimproved Condorcet to Approval (because
> you didn't want to compare it to ICT and Symmetrical ICT).
> 
> Ok. You mentioned the Chicken Dilemma. It exists in Approval and
> Condorcet. Unimproved Condorcet doesn't get rid of the Chicken
> Dilemma. It's basically the same in both methods.
> 
> Approval meets FBC. Unimproved Condorcet fails FBC.
> 
> Exactly how is unimproved Condorcet better than Approval?
> 
> Condorcet's Criterion?
> 
> Condorcet's Critrerion compliance is meaningless when people are
> favorite-burying.
> 
> Then there's the matter of the highly computation-intensive count that
> every rank method has, including the Condorcet methods.
> 
> Computation-intensive, labor-intensive count = big count-fraud opportunity.

It should be enough if you can record (digitally) the content of the ballots in a reliable way. Computations should not lead to fraud since they can be easily double checked. If the content of the ballots is mabe public, checking is really easy. If the content of the ballots is secret for privacy reasons, then we need to agree who can check the calculations.

> 
> ...and it also means machine balloting and computerized count. That
> means an even more greatly-enhanced count-fraud opportunity.

Machine balloting is a risk in all methods (if votes are only bits, and there is no paper copy). Also complex ballots like ranked and rated ballots can be implemented on paper quite well (= without too bad limitations). Computerized count is not a problem if reliable source data is available for checks.

> 
> Even if you could find a significant advantage of unimproved Condorcet
> over Approval, that advantage wouldn't obtain when count-fraud is
> being done.
> 
>> If you want my opinion on Condorcet methods in general, I think they are remarkably well >balanced methods, for compromise seeking, competitive, majority style elections.
> 
> Unimproved Condorcet gives incentive &/or need for favorite-burial,
> unlike Approval or ICT or Symmetrical ICT.
> 
> Yes, you could find voters who wouldn't be susceptible to that
> incentive. I can show you millions who would be. It's better to just
> not cause it at all. Because that is so easily achieved, there's no
> need for favorite-burial incentive.
> 
> When favorite-burial happens, it distorts preferences so as to make a
> joke of the election.
> 
> Unimproved Condorcet, unlike ICT and Symmetrical ICT, has the Chicken Dilemma.
> 
> Unimproved Condorcet, unlike Approval, Score, and Symmetrical ICT,
> fails Later-No-Help.
> 
> 
> You said:
> 
> They thus have quite well balanced "well enoughs" / vulnerabilities.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> Is that what you call the above-described attributes?

I stick to my comment on Condorcet methods (see above). Maybe someone should arrange a real-life political Condorcet election so we could see how extensive favourite burial there will be and how much that will influence the results. Otherwise it seems to be just your guess against mine. I don't believe that the existence of a (theoretical) FBC vulnerability would automatically lead to widespread favourite betrayal. Again I refer to Burlington IRV elections as an argument why this probably would not happen even in the U.S. (The last sentence is about the U.S. The others are generic.)

Juho


> 
> Mike Ossipoff