[EM] Scoring (was Re: OpenSTV 2.1.0 released)

[Michael Ossipoff]

Maybe you meant to compare unimproved Condorcet to Approval (because
you didn't want to compare it to ICT and Symmetrical ICT).

Ok. You mentioned the Chicken Dilemma. It exists in Approval and
Condorcet. Unimproved Condorcet doesn't get rid of the Chicken
Dilemma. It's basically the same in both methods.

Approval meets FBC. Unimproved Condorcet fails FBC.

Exactly how is unimproved Condorcet better than Approval?

Condorcet's Criterion?

Condorcet's Critrerion compliance is meaningless when people are
favorite-burying.

Then there's the matter of the highly computation-intensive count that
every rank method has, including the Condorcet methods.

Computation-intensive, labor-intensive count = big count-fraud opportunity.

...and it also means machine balloting and computerized count. That
means an even more greatly-enhanced count-fraud opportunity.

Even if you could find a significant advantage of unimproved Condorcet
over Approval, that advantage wouldn't obtain when count-fraud is
being done.

> If you want my opinion on Condorcet methods in general, I think they are remarkably well >balanced methods, for compromise seeking, competitive, majority style elections.

Unimproved Condorcet gives incentive &/or need for favorite-burial,
unlike Approval or ICT or Symmetrical ICT.

Yes, you could find voters who wouldn't be susceptible to that
incentive. I can show you millions who would be. It's better to just
not cause it at all. Because that is so easily achieved, there's no
need for favorite-burial incentive.

When favorite-burial happens, it distorts preferences so as to make a
joke of the election.

Unimproved Condorcet, unlike ICT and Symmetrical ICT, has the Chicken Dilemma.

Unimproved Condorcet, unlike Approval, Score, and Symmetrical ICT,
fails Later-No-Help.


You said:

They thus have quite well balanced "well enoughs" / vulnerabilities.

[endquote]

Is that what you call the above-described attributes?

Mike Ossipoff