[EM] Let's clear up some confusion

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 3:25 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> You explanation sounds like a pretty regular ranked ballot approach. If I rank U and V second, I want them to lose to the firsts and win the rest.

Quite so.

And (regarding your 2nd-ranked candidates), it's because you want
someone else (your 1st ranked) to win more than you want your 2nd
ranked to win, and because you also want your 2nd ranked to win more
than you want your 3rd ranked to win--That's what makes the top and
bottom rank positions different from all of the other rank positions.

Your top-ranked candidates: You'd prefer that they win instead of anyone else.

Your bottom-ranked candidates. You'd prefer that anyone but them wins.

Neither of those things can be said for any other rank position, other
than top or bottom rank position. For the reason that you stated in
your above-quoted text.

That's why, in keeping with what the voter would prefer and wishes
with hir equal top and equal bottom rankings, Symmetrical ICT
interprets equal top and bottom ranking as it does. That's why no
other rank positions are treated in that way--because the voter intent
and preference that I refer to at top and bottom rank position doesn't
apply at any other rank position.

Because, when ranking X and Y in 1st place, you'd prefer that the
winner be from {X,Y}, then you don't want either to pairwise-beat the
other, which could change the winner from someone in {X,Y} to someone
else, like your last choice. So Symmetrical ICT lets you have your
ballot counted as automatically voting between X and Y in such a way
as to keep either from beating the other.

It's your vote. It's your ballot, and it's your pairwise vote between
X and Y. It should be counted in your best interest, in keeping with
what you prefer and intend, when ranking X and Y equal top, or when
ranking W and Z equal bottom.

Mike Ossipoff



>
> Juho
>
>
> On 3.10.2012, at 6.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> Juho:
>>
>> In improved Condorcet, the voter who equal top ranks X and Y, or who
>> equal bottom ranks W and Z, doesn't have any more power to vote one
>> over the other, or to not do so, than any otther voter has to vote one
>> candidate over the other or no do so.
>>
>> Nor does a vote for X over Y, or for Y over X, counted for the ballot
>> of a voter top ranking X and Y, have any more power or effect as a
>> pairwise vote cast by any voter between any two candidates.
>> Likewise for the equal bottom ranking voter who ranks W and Z at
>> bottom. ("at bottom" means not voted over anyone).
>>
>> So then, what makes Improved Condorcet different from unimproved
>> Condorcet?  How is it more favorable to the equal top or equal bottom
>> ranking voter, without giving undue power to that voter?:
>>
>> With respect to X and Y, hir ballot is counted in hir beat interest,
>> in keeping with hir preferences, intent and wishes.
>>
>> As for what that means, I'll say it again:
>>
>> If you rank X and Y both in 1st place, that means that you'd rather
>> elect one of them (either one of them) than anyone whom you don't rank
>> in 1st place.
>>
>> If you rank W and Z at bottom, that means that you'd rather elect
>> anyone whom you rank above bottom, instead of W or Z.
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff
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