[EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Tue, Oct 2, 2012 at 12:55 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> On 2.10.2012, at 4.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> A) What is it that is gained by using traditional (unimproved)
>> Condorcet instead of Symmetrical Improved Condorcet?
>>
>> The downsides of unimproved are:
>>
>> .....1. FBC failure (though unimproved-Condorcet advocates speculate
>> that people won't mind)
>
> The traditional interpretation of ranked votes may well support FBC "well enough" in the classical Condorcet methods.

Yes, that's what I meant by "speculation".

And note that that speculation is coming from someone who likewise
accepts Margins' failure of the Plurality Criterion. How often Margins
fails Plurality isn't the issue. The examples in which it does will be
widely shared with the public, by the opponents of any enactment
proposal for any method that violates that criterion (or any other
embarrassment-criterion).


Speculation that voters won't be affected by a strategy-incentive is
one form that unimproved Condorcet rationalization and self-deception
can take.

But my purpose, at this stage of the procedure isn't to argue about
the criteria and properties, so much as to establish what unimproved
Condorcet advocates think make unimproved Condorcet so good as to
outweigh the disadvantages that I listed.

By the way, of course it's better to call a method by the name used by
its advocates. We have a term for the more EM-popular (unimproved)
Condorcet versions: "Strong Condorcet". That's the term that I'll
start using. It refers to Beatpath, Ranked-Pairs, River, Goldfish,
Kemeny, and VoteFair. Maybe other similar methods too. Sometimes I'll
abbreviate "Strong Condorcet" to "Strong".

>
>> .....2. Interpretation of equal-top and equal-bottom ranking is
>> contrary to the voter's preferences, intent and wishes.
>
> I guess by default the meaning of equal-top and equal-bottom ranking is to rank the candidates equal.

Wrong.

Ranking X and Y in 1st place, or ranking W and Z in last place
additionally means that that voter prefers that the winner be X or Y,
or that the voter would rather that the winner be someone else other
than W or Z.

And, you see, that's where unimproved Condorcet --excuse me, I meant
"Strong Condorcet"--parts ways with what the voter prefers.

I've explained this before, here at EM. I'll explain it again if requested.

>The voter may have interest to cast a stronger vote where the equal-top and equal-bottom rankings have some additional strength

...such as being interpreted and counted in keeping with that voter's
preferences, intent and wishes? Yes.

>, but that's another story

Indeed,  in Strong, that is indeed another story. Strong has its own
story, and it isn't about what the voter actually prefers.


>, and not the default interpretation of ranked votes.

You mean _your_ default interpretation of ranked votes. From what you
said, your "default" interpretation of equal top ranking disregards
the voter's preference for the top-ranked candidates over the other
candidates. Indeed, that is a different story.

Mike Ossipoff