[EM] Kristofer: Brief summary of my long reply

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Oct 19 13:20:16 PDT 2012


Kristofer:

Approval vs TUC:

If Approval passes Clone Independence, then for TUC (traditional
unimproved Condorcet) to have Clone Independence doesn't improve on
Approval at all.

My statement was that you can't significantly improve on Approval
unless you get rid of the chicken Dilemma (pass CD). If Approval
passes Clone Independence, then passing Clone Independence isn't an
improvement on Approval.

TUC would have to have an improvement on Approval sufficient to
justify TUC's loss of FBC, Participation, Consistency and IIAC.
...and also the much more labor-intensive count of TUC or any rank
method, and consequent count-fraud-vulnerability.

If Approval fails the Clone Independence that you're referring to then:

1. Post a precise definition of the Clone Independence that you're
referring to. Don't just link to a website, which might have a vague
definition or several definitions. Post a precise definition here.

2. Show an example of Approval failing that Clone Independence.

3. Tell what are the adverse societal consequences of that Clone
Independence failure, sufficient to justify the loss of compliance
with FBC, Participation, Consistency, and IIAC.   ...and the much
greater count-computation-intensiveness and consequent count-fraud
vulnerability.

Or, if there's some other advantage, other than Clone Independence,
that you claim for TUC over Approval and Score, then what is it?

ICT and Symmetrical ICT vs TUC:

This repeats part of the above.

1. Post a precise definition of the Clone Independence Criterion to
which you're referring.

2. Show an example in which ICT and Symmetrical ICT fail your Clone
Independence.

3. Tell what are the adverse societal consequences of that Clone
Independence failure, sufficient to justify the loss of compliance
with FBC and CD.

Mike Ossipoff



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