[EM] Voting systems for other societies, electorates and choices

[Michael Ossipoff]

We've discussed this before, but I'd like to comment on it again:

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Ideal Society with completely honest voters:

Try to satisfy Rawls' standard.

Score balloting. Instruct voters to rate the candidates proportional
to utility, to the extent that they can put a number to it.

Elect the candidate or alternative whose lowest rating on any ballot
is the highest.

Remember that all voters are completely honest. Of course there's a
possibility of ties, in which case another method would have to be
used. Maybe, among the tied candidates, just do an ordinary Score
count, using the same ballots.  Maybe hold a 2nd election, among the
tied candidates, by Approval or MMPO. (Approval would elect the
candidate acceptable to the most people; MMPO would elect the
candidate with fewest people preferring another to it--If an
alternative is really bad for you, you'll rank it at bottom with lots
of alternatives over it.)

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Voters vote for self-interest, but agree about Rawls' desideratum:

Shouldn't be Condorcet (including ICT)--too majoritarian.

Approval, or MMPO (for the reasons given above) would be good.

Or, because of MMPO's greater vulnerability to burial, maybe MDDTR
(burial wasn't a problem with honest voters, in the previous section).

Reducing burial-vulnerability would come at the price of MDDTR's
top-count, which isn't in keeping with the desideratum.

I suggest that MMPO's burial vulnerability needn't be such a great
problem. Every strategy has a counter-strategy (pre-emptive
defensive/retaliatory burial?).

It would be like a (secondary) chicken dilemma, but not as bad,
because it's secondary. MMPO, like ICT and MDDTR, has no primary
chicken dilemma.

Other than its burial vulnerability, MMPO has good properties. Unlike
any Condorcet version (including ICT), MMPO and MDDTR meet
Later-No-Harm (LNHa).

Unlike any Condorcet version, MMPO (but not MDDTR) meets not only
Participation, but also the stronger Mono-Add-Top (as do Approval and
Score).

Yes, MMPO fails the Plurality Criterion, and has Kevin's MMPO
bad-example (which, it seems to me, is a Plurality Criterion failure).

But I remind you that the assumption was that the people agree on
Rawls' desideratum. That means that MMPO's intrinsic advantage, a
count rule that is a standard in and of itself,
would be more important to people than an embarrassment criterion. And
I remind you that Kevin's MMPO bad-example, though it would be loudly
trumpeted by opponents, consists of the election of a winner such that
_no one_ thinks that that winner is worse than the other candidates.

(I criticized Margins Condorcet for its Plurality failure the other
day. I did so because that embarrassment criterion would likely be
fatal to an enactment proposal under presently-existing conditions.
It's a reason why I abandoned MMPO for proposal under existing
conditions).

Condorcetists tell us that Plurality Criterion failure is worse than
Participation and Mono-Add-Top failure. But failure of Participation
and Mono-Add-Top (but especially Plurality)  are monotonicity
failures, instances of something worse than unresponsiveness, when a
method acts contrary to what you express on your ballot. You turn your
steering wheel right, and the car goes left.. Could it be that those
Condorcetists have convinced themselves of that because they've
already decided and agreed that they want to propose Condorcet? You
know, "group-think".

Those monotonicity violations are instances of your ballot acting
oppositely to your intent, and are, as such, worse than Plurality
failure or the MMPO bad-example.

What might be an example of group-think? Well, just hypothetically of
course :-)  ,suppose there were a group of people who had decided that
they were going to advocate unimproved Condorcet.

Well, I'd bet that maybe they'd debate endlessly about which kind of
unimproved Condorcet is the best, under the dogmatic, group-think,
not-subject-to-question, assumption that their initial belief and
choice is right.

Remember that this is just hypothetical.

(I didn't mean to make this section so long, but I digressed)

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Currently-existing conditions  (Count fraud problem, voters pursuing
self-interest. No moral consensus):

No rank method, due to count-fraud problem, and difficulty of
agreement on a rank-count.

Approval or Score, for the reasons that I've been giving here at EM.

Approval is probably a better proposal, due to its simpler (and
therefore less fraud-prone) count, and because it's the natural,
obvious, minimal improvement on Plurality.

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Informational polling, to inform and guide voting in an upcoming
Plurality election:

Condorcet's Critrerion is very desirable, to find the candidate on
whom votes should be combined (something that is necessary in
Plurality, with its split-vote problem).

Condorcet's Criterion is useful only if the worst
preference-distorting strategy needs are avoided.

For that reason, I recommend ICT for informational polling.

If a rank-count can't be agreed on, or if a handcountable method is
needed, then I'd suggest Score, as a 2nd choice.

Approval would do, if a still easier handcount is needed.

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Voting on what movie to go to or rent:

Favoriteness is all important for that application.

Just use Plurality.

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Voting on an ice-cream flavor, or a kind of pizza:

Dislike becomes more important (as compared to voting on a movie choice).

I'd suggest Condorcet (Of course I'd suggest ICT), Score, or Approval.

In Score, voters should be encouraged to vote strategically, unless
you believe in the discredited moral philosophy of Utilitarianism.

Comparing Score to Approval, I prefer Score's easier fractional
rating, useful for SFR, or when it's uncertain whether an alternative
qualifies for top-rating.

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Approval's simpler (and therefore more secure) count, and Approval's
minimal change from Plurality probably make it a better proposal for
official public elections.

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Mike Ossipoff












Mike Ossipoff