[EM] Juho: Sincere ranking, contd.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Juho:

On 15.11.2012, at 18.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> If I ranked all of the candidates sincerely, the Democrat and the
> Republican would be at the bottom of that ranking. Even if they're
> winnable.
>
> So you can't say that not ranking unwinnable candidates allows you to
> vote a short ranking.

Juho repled:

I said that not ranking unwinnable candidates does not cause very much harm.

[endquote]

Yes, and then I said that that doesn't mean that you don't need to
vote a long ranking in TUC. My point was that Symmetrical ICT would
save you a lot of distasteful long-ranking work, in a many-candidates
election.

Juho said:

In your case I assume that your most preferred candidates can not win.

[endquote]


1, The above discussion was about bottom-end considerations, not about
favorites.

2. Don't worry about me. The problem that I spoke of, regarding
favorite-burial, was about how the larger voting public will vote,
given that they believe the Democrat-disinformation, and given TUC's
optimal strategy, given that belief.

3. But ok, assume that, of the candidates I regard as acceptable, the
only one who can win is one who isn't my favorite. In TUC or IRV, I'd
rank that one winnable acceptable alone in 1st place.

...as would nearly all voters here. In ICT or Symmetrical ICT, I'd of
course rank all of the acceptables in 1st place, as would everyone
else. In Approval I'd approve all of the acceptables, as would
everyone else.

Juho said:

Based on that you could leave them unranked

[endquote]

No need to leave your favorites unranked just because they can't win.
Just rank them below the winnable acceptable(s).

Juho said;

, but you should rank at least one of the two winnable candidates.

[endquote]


Where did you get your assumption that there are and will be only two
winnable candidates. From the mass-media, no doubt. :-)

But certainly. If the method is TUC(margins) or IRV, and it's
genuinely, fully, 0-info, then rank all the candidates in sincere
order of preference.

But real 0-info, at top-end, is unlikely. Without it, in any kind of
Condorcet or IRV, you won't know what to do. That's a good argument
for Approval and Score.

Juho said:

This (focus on who wins) is the way we usually measure the performance
of election methods and study the recommended voting practices for the
voters.

[endquote]

Yes. There's a good reason for that. Pragmatism, optimal voting based
on predictive beliefs and acceptability beliefs, is known to be what
governs people's voting here. That isn't in doubt.


There could however be other reasons why it would make sense to rank
your favourite candidates. You could rank them at top to help them (or
their party) to win at the next election. Or you could give them this
way some encouragement and thumbs up, and you could increase their
chances of becoming elected in some other important position. In order
to get good information on the true preferences of the electorate (for
statistics and studies) it would make sense for all voters to always
rank as many candidates as possible.

[endquote]

Voters here have made it abundantly clear that they're instrumental
voters: They vote only to optimize their outcome in the current
election, based on their predictive and acceptability beliefs.

Yes, for finding the CW, of course it's desirable for people to rank
all of the candidates. TUC(margins) is the method that meets the
Condorcet Criterion and 0-info Sincerity. The problem is that there
will be strong enough predictive feelings at top end so that people
won't rank sincerely. That's why I say that the goal of sincere
rankings and electing the CW must be abandoned.

> Sure, there's a case for saying that people would enjoy indicating who
> is worst. I just don't think that the Democrats and Republicans
> deserve to be ranked at all. Not ranking them at all is better than
> dignifying them with rank positions--even last and 2nd-to-last.

That sounds like you are talking about implicit approval of all the
ranked candidates.

[endquote]

I'll guess that "implicit approval" means ranking the same candidates
whom I'd approve if it were an Approval election.

Yes, you're right then. In Approval we don't approve unacceptables. In
a rank method, I'd aesthetically prefer to not rank unacceptables.
That's why I prefer Symmetrical ICT, among the rank methods.

Not ranking all of the candidates would work against finding the CW.
But, as described above, we won't find the CW anyway.


Juho says:

I prefer to see rankings as rankings, i.e. truncated vote A>B means
A>B>C=D=E, not A>B>>>C=D=E

[endquote]

Ok, but when there are lots of candidates, most of them unacceptable,
you're in for a lot of unnecessary ranking work. But if you like that,
then it's no problem.

That's why I offer ICT as well as Symmetrical ICT, for polling. (and
also as preferable alternatives to TUC, for people who want
rank-balloting in official public elections--though I recommend only
Approval and Score for official public elections).


Juho said:

..., if we talk about traditional Condorcet methods that usually treat
truncations that way. But I guess you are talking about methods that
intentionally want to use implicit approval.

[endquote]

I'm talking about a method, Symmetrical ICT, that makes it unnecessary
to rank unacceptables.

For people who want incentive to sincerely rank unacceptables, I offer
ordinary ICT.

I'm just saying that I feel that your goal of entirely sincere
rankings, even at top-end, is unattainable, due to predictive
information, genuine or perceived.

Juho said:

I believe many people would be happy to tell who is worst. But it is
not a good idea to allow them to vote A>B>all_others>Y>Z since that
could lead to unexpected and bad results.

[endquote]

Yes,it seems to me that there were problems with that, when it was
discussed. I don't propose it.

Juho said:

Allowing them to rank A>B>C>D>Y>Z(>all_others) is better since then
they have to explicitly indicate that C and D are better than Y and Z.

[endquote]

True.

Mike Ossipoff