[EM] IRV Revisited. Easy Implementation of Plurality's Optimal Strategy.

[Michael Ossipoff]

1. Instant Runoff Revisited:

Getting a better voting system enacted, for national office, will be
very difficult, and maybe impossible. The problem is that of course
the existing legislators, and their bribers, aren't motivated to
replace the voting system that keeps them in power.

If there is a voting system that can be enacted at national level, it
would be Approval. But _any_ voting system reform might be impossible,
without electing new President and Congress.

The Greens Party U.S. (GPUS) is by far the most winnable party that
offers genuine progressive reform and improvement. Their platform
includes voting-system reform. Their platform offers to replace
Plurality with Instant-Runoff (IRV).

Of course some of us have discussed IRV's problems. Its worst ones
include FBC failure, and count-fraud-vulnerability, due to not being
precinct-summable.

But, because, most likely, the only way that we're ever going to get a
better voting system for national office will be by electing better
Congress and President, and because the Greens are the most winnable
progressive party, and because IRV is the new voting system that the
Greens offer to enact, then I suggest that IRV deserves another look.

Let's look at its two significant problems: FBC failure, and
count-fraud-vulnerability due to not being precinct-summable:

1a) FBC failure:

I've been rejecting every voting system that fails FBC. But, because
of what I said a few paragraphs back, let's take a closer look at
IRV's FBC failure:

Any electorate that can elect the Greens in a Plurality election isn't
going to have any trouble using IRV.  Such an electorate must have
already become able to not be unduly influenced by Plurality's FBC
failure.

An electorate that can elect the Greens in a Plurality election is
competent enough to get by without FBC.

u/a strategy for FBC:

Rank the acceptable candidates in order of (some measure of, or feel
for) winnability.

As for the unacceptables, it doesn't really matter how you rank them,
because, your vote won't reach them unless the acceptables have all
been eliminated. I don't know how to rank the unacceptables in a
non-0-info u/a election, but it doesn't matter.

In a 0-info election, rank all the candidates in sincere order of
preference. Approval and IRV are the methods that meet the 0-Info
Sincerity Criterion.

1b)  IRV's lack of precinct-summability, and resulting count-fraud
vulnerability:

For one thing, we could expect that, in a Green government, there
wouldn't be official count-fraud. Of course there could still be
individuals motivated to perpetrate count-fraud.

But a national IRV hand-count could be done in a way that wouldn't be
seriously or particularly count-fraud-vulnerable:

Each precinct, around the country, does a handcount of the candidates'
top-counts, and sends them in to the national count headquarters, via
some secure sending method.

Each precinct's handcount, and the national handcount, would be
conducted and observed by representatives of a variety of parties all
across the political spectrum. Each participating party would also
televise the count, at the precincts, and in the national handcount,
with _its own_ video camera and sound-recorder. Likewise, each
participating party would have its own video camera, and maybe its own
lock, protecting the stored ballots and count records.

The natiional count headquarters handcounts those top-totals, to
determine who is eliminated.

The information about the eliminated candidate is sent to the local
precincts, and is also announced in the ongoing report-broadcast.

Each precinct crosses that eliminated candidate's name out from the
rankings, and again does a handcount of the candidates' top-counts,
and sends them to national headquarters.

...and so on.

The precincts would keep their ballots securely.

The paper ballots would ideally be printed out from voting machines.
The voter would look at his/her printed-out ballot, to ensure that
it's as s/he wants it.

The national count headquarters would record each precinct top-count
that it receives, from each precinct, at each stage. That would be
recorded on paper, and securely guarded.

The national count headquarters would announce the candidates' total
top-counts, in the ongoing report-broadcast, at each stage of the
count.

People in the local precincts could examine the records of the
top-counts nationally-recorded from their precinct.

There's probably a way that the above count method could be done securely.

I much prefer Approval's maximally simple handcount. I prefer
Approval's compliance with FBC, and the various consistency criteria.

But IRV would do just fine, for an electorate competent enough to
elect the Greens with Plurality.

1c) Regarding IRV's properties:

Aside from IRV's FBC failure, and its lack of precinct summability,
and its count that's more complicated than an Approval count--problems
that have already been dealt with in this message, IRV's has some very
good properties:

IRV is one of the very few methods that meets Later-No-Harm. For one
thing, that means no chicken dilemma.

IRV meets Mutual-Majority and Clone-Independence, and Later-No-Help.

So, IRV meets these desirable criteria:

LNHa
LNhe
CD
Mutual Majority
Clone-Independence

Yes, I'd much rather have Approval or Score, and that's what i
recommend for enactment proposals. I just don't offer much hope for
the enactment of any reform voting system without first electing a new
Congress and President...by Plurality. The Greens are the winnable
progressive party. IRV is the voting system that they offer. If we can
elect the Greens with Plurality, then IRV will be just fine for us.

Of course, one other possibility would remain, when the Greens are in
office: Advocate Approval and Score to them. But I've told, above,
why, if IRV is the voting system implemented by the Green government,
then IRV will be just fine.

I've told why failure of Clone-Independence isn't a problem for
Approval, Score, ICT and Symmetrical ICT, but Clone Independence is
still a nice bonus with IRV. I've told why Mutual Majority doesn't
mean much, without FBC. But that doesn't apply to an electorate that
is competent enough to elect the Greens with Plurality.

2. Making The Best Use of Plurality. Easily Voting Optimally in Plurality:

I've mentioned this in a previous post, but I should say it here too:

Plurality's u/a strategy is to combine votes on the most winnable
acceptable candidate.

I suggest that, for progressives, it's very obvious that the nominee
of the Green Party U.S. (GPUS) is, by far, the most winnable
acceptable candidate.

That makes it very easy to implement Plurality's optimal u/a strategy:

Progressives should vote for the nominee of the Green Party U.S.

...in presidential and Congressional elections.

...and why not in state elections too.

It's important that anyone who votes finds out about what's offered.
Don't let the tv (or the radio either0 be your information-source.
Look at the platforms of some of the media-banned parties (That's all
of the parties other than the officially endorsed and media-allowed
Republocrat part--usually spoken of as if it were two parties)

I claim that the GPUS platform offers the very things that people
around the county are saying that they want, and remedies the things
that people around the country are complaining about.

Mike Ossipoff