[EM] Later-No-Help Criterion

[Michael Ossipoff]

Someone said:

I'm not sure Later-no-help is inherently valuable.

[endquote]

Then let me assure you. It's inherently valuable, because it amounts
to a great simplification of bottom-end strategy.

Remember Later-No-Help next time you're voting in a Beatpath election,
and trying to decide how to rank all of the many unacceptable
candidates, right down to the worst, in a many-candidates election.

But if you think that strategy doesn't matter, then criteria like FBC,
CD and Later-No-Help won't matter to you.

In that case, join the current few EM frequent-posters in their
perpetual discussion of the relative advantages of different kinds ot
traditional unimproved Condorcet.

Symmetrical ICT meets the (legitimately-defined)  Condorcet Criterion,
FBC, CD, and Strong 0-info Later-No-Help, which is effectively as good
as Later-No-Help.

Approval and Score meet FBC, Later-No-Help, and such consistency
criteria as Participation, Mono-Add-Top, Consistency, and IIAC, all of
which are failed by traditional unimproved Condorcet.

Approval, Score and Symmetrical ICT have, by far, the simplest and
easiest u/a strategy:

Approval: Approve all of the acceptables and none of the unacceptables.

Score: Top rate the acceptables. Bottom-rate the unacceptables.

Symmetrical ICT: Top-rank the acceptables. Don't rank any unacceptables.


That person continued:

But even
if it is, many methods sacrifice it to accomplish something else.

[endquote]

You trade one desirable property for another.

If I offer to trade something for your car, you need to ask what I'm
trading, before you agree to the trade.

When recommending a trade, you need to look at what you're getting,
and be able to tell why it's better than what you're losing.

So then, what does traditional unimproved Condorcet gain, in return
for the abovementioned properties that it loses?

Regarding its Condorcet compliance, in its comparison with Approval, I
point out that Condorcet compliance is made meaningless and worthless
by the drastic preference-distortions resulting from the
strategy-needs of methods that fail FBC and CD.

Likewise for compliance with Smith, Condorcet-Loser, and Mutual-Majority.

Mike Ossipoff