[EM] Addenda to "What will happen..." post

[Juho Laatu]

On 29.5.2012, at 5.27, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> On May 28, 2012, at 9:17 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> 
>> As usual, I don't know what Dave Ketchum means.
> 
> Guessing as to what Mike O is assuming, our topic is whether Approval's inability to indicate such as A>B>C matters.  I read the words below indicating that voters can estimate, accurately, various situations to respond to.  While such may be possible, sometimes, it is better to not require such estimating.

I agree with that. I'd like to add that it is quite tricky to estimate which candiates one should approve since that estimate does not depend only on the estimated sincere opinions of other voters but also on the estimated strategic choices that they are likely to make. The decision process is thus cyclic and therefore not stable.

(If there are two winnable candidates in my wing that I expect to have majority, and if I estimate that others are going to approve both of them, then my best strategy would be to approve only one of them. If I estimate that others are going to do the same and approve only one of them, then my best strategy would be to approve both. Well, unless I'm so fed up with the supporters of the other candidate approving only their favourite (and with the Approval method) that I decide to do the same and let the other wing win this time.)

Juho


>> 
>> Returning to the subject-line's topic:
>> 
>> In Approval, with 3 candidates, or 3 candidates perceived viable:
>> 
>> 1. From the point of view of the middle candidate's supporters, there are 2
>> possibilities:
>> a. One of the extreme 2 has a majority, in which case it doesn't matter what
>> the Middle voters do
>> b. Or Middle is the CW, in which case it is the responsible for the smaller
>> extreme faction to approve Middle, not vice-versa.
>> 
>> 2. From the point of view of an extreme voter, misjudging whether to approve
>> Middle would amount to misjudging whether your faction is a majority, vs
>> whether your faction is smaller than the opposite faction. That would be a
>> big mis-estimate indeed, unless the middle faction is very small.
>> 
>> And, continuing #2,  from the point of view of an extreme voter,  everyone
>> has access to the same information, and so if it looks as if extreme A is
>> smaller than extreme B, then the B voters will think they don't need to
>> approve Middle. But the A voters will think that they _do_ need to approve
>> Middle. That means that, if the B voters are mistaken,  the B voters'
>> mistake won't be costly. The situation favors Middle.
>> 
>> Because of #1 and #2, the Middle voters have no reason to approve either
>> extreme. And for that reason, candidate A's approval count is a good
>> estimate for the number of A voters, and B's approval count is a good
>> estimate of the number of B voters. These are the things that the extreme
>> voters would like to know, or at least have an idea of.
>> 
>> In the 2nd Approval election, the progressives or Green-preferrers will have
>> a good idea of whether or not the Green can beat the Republican.
>> 
>> The Democrat good-cop/bad-cop scam will be finished, when people are
>> supporting what they really like, and therefore know what others like. Given
>> that, and the disillusionment about what the Republocrats have been doing,
>> and their difference from eachother, today's pessimistic and resigned
>> situation will be no more.
>> 
>> Mike Ossipoff
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