[EM] Rebuttal to article by Mike Ossipoff

[Michael Ossipoff]

Adrian, and EM members:

Richard said:

At Adrian's invitation, here is a suggested "rebuttal" to give balance to
Mike's article:

[endquote]

But Adrian referred to "the" rebuttal article, rather than "a" rebuttal
article, suggesting that someone else had already wanted to write a
rebuttal.

In any case, it had been my understanding that any disagreements with an
article were to be discussed here, on EM. EM, after all, is a discussion and
debate forum.  And so, regarding this rebuttal from Richard, I assume that
it is only posted to EM, rather than being published at Democracy
Chronicles, because having to publish rebuttals would impose on Democracy
Chronicles the role of a debate forum.

But if, nevertheless, Richard's rebuttal is going to be published at
Democracy Chronicles, does that mean that I can likewise rebut Richard's
statements in a rebuttal published in that publication?

Because, of course, if not, then that would mean that Richard can rebut my
statements, but his statements are safe from being answered in the
publication. 

I appreciate and agree with Richard's suggestion that article-criticisms
should be confined to instances in which an article "defies mathematical
principles".  And I trust that his rebuttal will be
confined to such matters.

Now, let's look at Richard's rebuttal:


-------------- begin ----------------

Mike Ossipoff is correct in claiming that Approval voting is a simple voting
method, and that it produces results that are much fairer than plurality
voting (which we now use).  However, most election-method experts do not
share Ossipoff's very high regard for the Favorite Betrayal Criterion.  

[endquote]

Richard seems to be saying that most election-method experts don't consider
it to matter, if voters have a strategic need to bury their
favorite--something that can and does result in major distortion of public
wishes.  It would be better to only make statements that he can support. He
seems to imply that he's quoting polling results. But, if so, he has
neglected to cite them specifically.

Condorcet wrote during the 18th century. The Favorite-Betrayal Criterion
(FBC) was defined during the 1990s. So yes, Condorcet's Criterion has been
around longer and is therefore better known.

Richard continues:

He does mention that Approval voting fails the more highly regarded
criterion called the Condorcet criteria

[endquote]

As I said, Condorcet's Criterion is much older and better-known. But,
Richard, it is a criterion, not a "criteria".

Richard continues:

, which basically says that the winner of a Condorcet-compliant voting
method would win a runoff election against any other candidate (assuming
that voters do not change their preferences).

[endquote]

That's a colloquial wording that comes fairly close. Below, it is said more
precisely, and worded so as to apply to all methods:


A Definition of Condorcet's Criterion:

X "pairbeats" Y if the number of voters ranking X over Y is greater than the
number of voters ranking Y over X.

A candidate who pairbeats every other candidate is called the "Condorcet
Winner" (CW).

If there is a  CW, and if everyone votes sincerely, then the CW should win.

[end of Condorcet's Criterion definition]

I've posted a definition of sincere voting, and will re-post it upon
request.

Richard continues:

  However his preference for simplicity over fairness is not shared by a
majority of election-method experts.

[endquote]

Note that Richard, in that sentence, is making two unsupported assumptions.

1. He's saying that violation of Condorcet's Criterion (CC) is more unfair
than violation of FBC.
2. He's saying that a majority of election-method experts agree with him.

Ask Richard which method has more advocates, as a public proposal: Approval
or his VoteFair (a quasi-Kemeny method), or even the
real Kemeny method.

And how does Richard expect to propose his complicated method, requiring at
least a page for its definition? "Trust me--You don't understand this, but
take my word for it: it is good!"
If it were undeniably better, that might work (but probably not). But of
course it isn't undeniably better. The method is subject to legitimate
criticism, and there are good arguments 
for its suboptimalilty.

I wasn't aware that we were taking a poll. But, as I said, if Richard wants
to report polling results, then
he needs to cite them specifically.

In any case, reliance on polls makes for a weak argument, and implies a lack
of better arguments.

Of course all of these arguments are ones that I've already been answering
here, on a daily basis. So, forgive me for the repetition, when I repeat my
replies to those arguments.

I've told, at great length, the observed and familiar consequences of FBC
violation.  The importance of a strategy criterion can be measured by the
adverse societal effects of the strategy
that is caused by failures of that criterion

But, let's say that someone doesn't agree with that. Then how about this?: 

How much does compliance with CC mean when voters are falsifying their
preferences by burying their favorites?

Richard continues:

The signers of the "Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates" 
support Approval voting for use in governmental elections.  Some of us who
strongly prefer other methods would be happy if Approval voting were used in
primary elections or selected smaller general elections.  In contrast, other
election-method experts (who have not signed the
Declaration) do not support the use of Approval voting in any governmental
election because it could produce disappointing results that might cause
voters to reject all election-method reforms and go back to plurality
voting.

[endquote]

Richard has returned to his claim about experts who oppose Approval.  Isn't
that his 3rd repetition of that claim in this rebuttal?  Why this dependence
of vaguely referring to unspecified people who agree with him or who oppose
Approval? Who are they, and what are their arguments in support of their
positions?

Richard says, "...it could produce disappointing results that might cause
voters to reject all election-method reforms and go back to Plurality
voting."

Richard needs to be a lot more specific here. How would Approval cause that?

I'm embarrassed to have to repeat this again: The difference between
Approval and Plurality is that, with Approval, every voter can always
support hir favorite candidate(s).
If, in Plurality, you're voting for your favorite, then, in Approval, you'll
probably approve only your favorite. If, in Plurality, you're instead voting
for a less-liked lesser-evil, then, in
Approval, you can, should, and will approve all of the candidates whom you
prefer to hir, including your favorite.

So, the difference in results, between Plurality and Approval, is that
people can vote for their more-liked candidates. The winner will be someone
better-liked. The "social utility" will be higher. The public satisfaction
with the winner will be higher.

Richard forgot to tell us how that is going to make people want to go back
to Plurality :-)

Richard continues:

Personally I encourage everyone to try Approval voting when you find
yourself in a group of people who are choosing where to eat.  In this case
each person raises their hand or says "yes" for each food choice they
approve, and whichever choice gets the most votes wins.  This method is much
fairer than the traditional ("plurality") approach of only allowing each
person to "approve" a single choice.

However, using Approval voting in hotly-contested general elections would be
highly controversial.

[endquote]

Richard likes to make unsupported assertions. Why would an Approval result
be more controversial than a Plurality result?

And what would be the controversy-criticism of electing the candidate to
whom the most voters have given an operational approval?

When people vote the way most people will, by voting for the candidates they
like or trust, then the winner will be the most liked &/or trusted
candidate.

What about when voting is strategic?

If there are unacceptable candidates who could win, then Approval will elect
the candidate who is acceptable to the most voters.

If not, but if voters don't possess any predictive information or feel about
winnability, then Approval will elect the candidate who is above-mean for
the most voters.

Otherwise, strategically-voted Approval will still elect the candidate who
is above-expectation to the most voters. ...the candidate who is at least a
little "too good to be true", for the most voters.
...the candidate who was optimistically hoped for by the most voters.

Richard neglected to tell us how that will cause dis-satisfaction with the
result, or how it could be criticized by Plurality-advocating opponents of
Approval.


Richard says:

I appreciate that Mike is helping to educate citizens about better voting
methods, yet it is important that bias either be avoided or pointed out.

[endquote]

Here's something that is important: If Richard wants to imply "bias", then
he needs to demonstrate it. In fact, it might help to say exactly what he
means by it.

Do I consider Approval to be a much more feasible proposal, as compared to
Kemeny, or Richard's Quasi-Kemeny, or Condorcet? Yes.  And also a better
method in an important regard?

Sure. But I tell why. Preference supported by arguments and justifications,
but with which Richard disagrees--Is that what Richard means by "bias"?

In general, as I said, Richard's rebuttal consists mostly of unsupported
assertions, and vague references to some majority of experts.  Let's hear
from those experts, and hear
their arguments. Richard, would you like to specifically cite some of those
experts to whom you refer? But don't forget to also quote their arguments in
support of their opinions.
Only in that way can we all evaluate these opinions that you keep referring
to.

I suggest that, In general, rank-balloting advocates don't appreciate or
understand the magnitude of the improvement that Approval would bring, in
comparison to Plurality. I suggest, too, 
that they're missing some of the problems in their rank-count contraptions,
and thereby expecting too much from a rank method. 

As I've said, I'd rather have ICT than Approval, provided that the
electorate either understand or trust that they can't gain from
favorite-burial.  So I'm not saying that Approval can't be improved upon in
any regard.

Approval's optimizations arguably make it the best method. But I like the
properties that ICT adds to Approval's FBC . Condorcet, Kemeny and
Quasi-Kemeny subtract FBC.

But, though I'd ideally prefer a certain rank method, that doesn't make it a
good public proposal. 

I've repeatedly told why Approval is the only proposed  reform voting system
that is obviously, transparently, an improvement, and only an improvement,
in comparison to Plurality.

Rank method advocates need to look at the doubts and uncertainties that will
hinder rank methods' acceptance anywhere, and which will quite fully prevent
their acceptance for elections
to national offices.

As I've said, Approval is nothing other than the elimination of the one
ridiculous falsification-requirement that is the cause of Plurality's
problem, and the resulting widespread enormously adverse
societal results.  For that reason, Approval won't be subject to the doubt
and uncertainty that will greet rank methods.


Mike Ossipoff




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