[EM] Rebuttal to article by Mike Ossipoff

[Richard Fobes]

[Here are my responses to Mike's comments about my "rebuttal."]

In a non-forum email message Adrian made a comment about Mike Ossipoff's 
article, and I replied (as part of replying to other topics as well) 
that I intended to post a message on the forum to refute a comment from 
Mike about him learning something significant from voting experiments 
done on the forum.  I didn't have time to write that intended message. 
Recently when Adrian said he would be posting the article soon, he asked 
if I wanted to write what he called "the" "rebuttal."

When I found and read the final version of Mike's article, Mike referred 
to a mock "presidential" poll on this forum, but apparently that took 
place before I became involved in this forum, so I was not in a position 
to make a comment about that.

Yes, of course you/Mike are allowed to respond to my "rebuttal." 
However, as is the norm for printed publications, you are not allowed to 
split up my comments with your comments -- just as I did not intersperse 
my "rebuttal" comments within your article.

Also, as is standard practice, you are not allowed to introduce new 
topics in your response to a "rebuttal."  If you don't know what this 
means, please read my "rebuttal" more carefully. (And if you still don't 
know what I mean, notice that I did not mention any Condorcet method, I 
only referred to the Condorcet criterion.)

Yes, I made a grammatical mistake when I used the word "criteria" 
instead of "criterion" in the words "... Approval voting fails the more
highly regarded criterion called the Condorcet criteria".

You ask for evidence to support my claim that most election-method 
experts do not regard the Favorite Betrayal Criterion as being as 
important as the Condorcet criterion.  On the election-method forum my 
observation is that far fewer participants have expressed support for 
FBC compared to Condorcet compliance.  We could conduct a poll here on 
the forum if you think I am mistaken.

In another message you refer to the idea of not mentioning other methods 
such as Condorcet methods, but that's irrelevant because I referred to 
the Condorcet criterion, not any Condorcet method.  If you are going to 
promote a specific criterion (FBC) as highly important, then I or 
someone else needs to balance that out by clarifying that the FBC 
criterion is just one of many criteria, and that FBC is not highly 
regarded by many election-method experts.

If you want to revise your article I won't mind, but of course then a 
new or revised rebuttal will be written (either by me or someone else).

(And if you want to be credible in your response to a rebuttal, then you 
need to respond with facts or clarifications that do not just repeat 
what you already said in your article.)

And remember that we are on the same side of the fence (trying to oppose 
the existing plurality method).

Richard Fobes


On 5/5/2012 12:00 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, May 4, 2012 at 4:55 AM, Richard Fobes
> <ElectionMethods at votefair.org <mailto:ElectionMethods at votefair.org>> wrote:
>
>     On 5/1/2012 7:12 PM, Adrian Tawfik wrote:
>
>         ... Do you have any interest in writing the rebuttal
>         article to Mr. Ossipoff? His article will be published soon.
>
>
>     At Adrian's invitation, here is a suggested "rebuttal" to give
>     balance to Mike's article:
>
> [endquote]
> The only reason why Adrian would say _the_ rebuttal, instead of _a_
> rebuttal would be because
> a rebuttal had already been brought up. Perhaps by you, Richard?
> There's nothing wrong with rebuttals. Debate, and open discussion, with
> everyone accountable, is a good thing.
> That's what EM is for. It's a debate-forum. It was my understanding that
> the evaluation &/or criticism of articles was to take place on EM.
> But is Richard suggesting that his rebuttal be published at Democracy
> Chronicles? If so, then would I have an
> opportunity to rebut Richard's statements too? Otherwise, Richard's
> statements would be safe from comment and criticism at Democracy Chronicles.
> The best solution, I would suggest, would be to confine the debate and
> rebuttal to EM. But if Richard rebuts my statements at Democracy
> Chronicles, than would I be able to rebut his statements there as well?
> I applaud and agree with Richard's suggestion that criticism of articles
> here should be limited to instances in which an article "...defies
> mathematical principles". I trust that Richard's rebuttal is confined to
> such matters.
> Richard, I thought that the understanding was that, if you found
> something wrong with an article, you'd mention it here, at EM, and then,
> if the article is demonstrably wrong, the offending passage(s) of the
> article would be deleted or modified. Have you changed the format? Would
> you rather impose on Democracy Chronicles the role of a debate-forum?
> Anyway, here is my rebuttal to your statements I hope that, if your
> "rebuttal" is published, mine will be also:
>
> -------------- begin ----------------
>
> Mike Ossipoff is correct in claiming that Approval voting is a simple
> voting method, and that it produces results that are much fairer than
> plurality voting (which we now use).  However, most election-method
> experts do not share Ossipoff's very high regard for the Favorite
> Betrayal Criterion.
> [endquote]
> That's what is known as an "unsupported statement". Is Richard referring
> to a poll? If so, then he needs to specify the poll. Or when he refers
> to "most election-method experts", he should name at least two, and his
> evidence that a majority share their view.  And, Richard, don't forget
> to quote their arguments in support of their statements. Without that,
> it isn't really possible for us to evaluate the validity of those
> statements.
> Perhaps Richards wants to say that most election-method experts think
> it's ok for a method to create a strategic need for favorite-burial.
> But, as I said, to make that claim, he would need to name some of those
> experts, and quote their arguments.
> Reliance on polls (even when they are specified), or on vague references
> to others' opinions, is a very weak argument, and one which strongly
> implies a lack of genuine arguments.
> Instead, say, "Someone named ___________ gives the following reasons in
> support of my claims...."
> Richard continues:
> He does mention that Approval voting fails the more highly regarded
> criterion called the Condorcet criteria
> [endquote]
> Condorcet wrote during the 18th century. The Favorite-Burial Criterion
> (FBC) was first defined in the 1990s. And so Condorcet's Criterion is
> more well-known than FBC.
> When voters feel strategic need to bury their favorite, then public
> wishes are distorted. ...grossly distorted, if the
> favorite-burial is at all widespread. It's obvious that the societal
> results of that can't be good. That isn't hypothetical. It's observed in
> our Plurality political system.
> Those who cite Condorcet's Criterion tend to forget or miss this:
> If people are burying their favorites, then what does it mean, for a
> method to comply with Condorcet's Criterion?
> It loses its meaning.
> Richard continues:
> , which basically says that the winner of a Condorcet-compliant voting
> method would win a runoff election against any other candidate (assuming
> that voters do not change their preferences).
> [endquote]
> That's a colloquial wording that gives the right impression. But here's
> a better wording of what Richard meant:
> A definition of Condorcet's Criterion:
> X "pairbeats" Y iff the number of voters ranking X over Y is greater
> than the number of voters ranking Y over X.
> A "Condorcet Winner" (CW) is a candidate who pairbeats all of the other
> candidates.
> If there is a CW, and if everyone votes sincerely, then that CW should win.
> [end of definition of Condorcet's Criterion]
> (I've previously posted a precise definition of sincere voting, and I'll
> re-post it upon request)
> And, Richard, CC is a criterion, not a "criteria".
> Richard continues:
>   However his preference for simplicity over fairness is not shared by a
> majority of election-method experts.
> [endquote]
> Of course that sentence contains two unsupported opinions:
> 1. The opinion that fairness requires Condorcet's Criterion over FBC.
> 2. The opinion that a majority of election-method experts agree with
> Richard about that.
> Richard continues:
>
> ... In contrast, other election-method experts (who have not signed the
> Declaration) do not support the use of Approval voting in any
> governmental election because it could produce disappointing results
> that might cause voters to reject all election-method reforms and go
> back to plurality voting.
> [endquote]
> Again, two unsupported opinions of Richard's:
> 1. Approval could produce disappointing results that might cause voters
> to go back to Plurality voting.
> But evidently Richard doesn't want to tell us what those disappointing
> results would or might be, or how Approval will make people want to go
> back to Plurality.
> I'm embarrassed to have to repeat this again:
> If, in Plurality, you really vote for your favorite, then you will or
> should approve only hir in Approval.
> If, in Plurality, you instead vote for a less-liked "lesser-of-2-evils",
> then, in Approval, you'd probably approve hir, and, additionally,
> everyone whom you like better, including your favorite(s).
> In other words, the only difference is that people are supporting
> candidates whom they like more. A more liked candidate is being elected.
> Richard neglected to tell us how that would make people want to go back
> to Plurality.
> It would be difficult to try to argue that it's bad to elect to an
> office the candidate who has been approved for that
> office by the most voters.
> Someone could say, "But what if some approvals are _strategic?"  No,
> it's still true that that winning candidate has been approved for the
> office by the most voters. It isn't for us to question their motives.
> Some other optimizations achieved by Approval:
> A. If most people vote the way that l most recommend, then the winner
> will be the candidate liked &/or trusted or regarded as deserving of
> support by the most voters.
> B. If voters vote according to strategy:
> B1. If there are unacceptable candidates who could win, then the winner
> will be the candidate who is acceptable to the most voters.
> B2a. If there aren't unacceptable candidates who could win, and voters
> have no predictive information or feel about winnability, then the
> winner will be the candidate who is above-mean for the most voters.
> B2b. If none of the above conditions obtain, then the winner will still
> be the candidate who is above-expectation for the most voters.
> (Actually, B2b is the general Approval strategy. All of the other
> Approval strategies that I've mentioned are special cases of it. So is
> the familiar "best-frontrunner-and-better" strategy suggestion. So B2b's
> optimization applies whenever voters approve strategically).
> B2b means that the winner will be the candidate who is, at least a
> little, "too good to be true" for the most voters.
> ...the candidate optimistically hoped for by the most voters.
> So then, Richard, which of these things will make people want to go back
> to Plurality?
>
> Richard continues:
>
> However, using Approval voting in hotly-contested general elections
> would be highly controversial.
> [endquote]
> Again, Richard doesn't give any support for his claim. What would be
> controversial about Approval, for highly-contested elections, Richard?
>
> Richards continues:
> I am offering this as a possible rebuttal, but if someone else has a
> stronger desire to write a rebuttal, I won't mind if this one is not used.
> [endquote]
> Used for what, where? If Richard's "rebuttal" is published, then I
> should have this opportunity to thoroughly consistent use of unsupported
> opinions and unreferenced quotes.
> Richard continues:
>
> I appreciate that Mike is helping to educate citizens about better
> voting methods, yet it is important that bias either be avoided or
> pointed out.
> [endquote]
> It's also important that, if Richard wants to claim that my article is
> biased, he should specify what statement in particular is biased, and
> why he thinks so.
> In fact, there's the question of what he means by "bias". And if he's
> using a definition found in a dictionary, then I invite him to show
> that, by that definition, my article has "bias".
> But it's easier to make statements without supporting them.
> One more thing: Richard, like other rank-balloting advocates, is
> forgetting or missing the enactment problem of the
> complicated contraptions known as rank-counts. In my article I discussed
> that problem, so I won't repeat all of what I said. But the unknown
> results of a complicated method, the possibility of unforseen and
> undesirable results, will greatly hinder the enactability of a rank
> method. Opponents, news commentators, anchor-men, and hired authorities
> will point out that people don't really know how it will do. They'll say
> "This needs a lot more study", and it will never happen.
> This will be a problem for municipal enactment. It will fully prevent
> enactment for federal offices.
> By the way, Richard, tell us: Which method has more expert advocates:
> Approval or VoteFair (a quasi-Kemeny), or even real Kemeny?
> And how would you propose VoteFair, with its at-least-page-long
> definition? "Even though you don't understand
> this [how many will even read it?], the rationale for it, or what its
> consequences will be, take my word for it. It's good."
> If it were undeniably one of the best, than that might even work (but
> probably not). But of course it is not. There will be plenty of people
> pointing out the ways in which it is suboptmal.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>