[EM] Rebuttal to article by Mike Ossipoff

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Fri, May 4, 2012 at 4:55 AM, Richard Fobes
<ElectionMethods at votefair.org>wrote:

> On 5/1/2012 7:12 PM, Adrian Tawfik wrote:
>
>> ... Do you have any interest in writing the rebuttal
>> article to Mr. Ossipoff? His article will be published soon.
>>
>
> At Adrian's invitation, here is a suggested "rebuttal" to give balance to
> Mike's article:
>
[endquote]

The only reason why Adrian would say _the_ rebuttal, instead of _a_
rebuttal would be because
a rebuttal had already been brought up. Perhaps by you, Richard?

There's nothing wrong with rebuttals. Debate, and open discussion, with
everyone accountable, is a good thing.
That's what EM is for. It's a debate-forum. It was my understanding that
the evaluation &/or criticism of articles was to take place on EM.

But is Richard suggesting that his rebuttal be published at Democracy
Chronicles? If so, then would I have an
opportunity to rebut Richard's statements too? Otherwise, Richard's
statements would be safe from comment and criticism at Democracy Chronicles.

The best solution, I would suggest, would be to confine the debate and
rebuttal to EM. But if Richard rebuts my statements at Democracy
Chronicles, than would I be able to rebut his statements there as well?

I applaud and agree with Richard's suggestion that criticism of articles
here should be limited to instances in which an article "...defies
mathematical principles". I trust that Richard's rebuttal is confined to
such matters.

Richard, I thought that the understanding was that, if you found something
wrong with an article, you'd mention it here, at EM, and then, if the
article is demonstrably wrong, the offending passage(s) of the article
would be deleted or modified. Have you changed the format? Would you rather
impose on Democracy Chronicles the role of a debate-forum?


Anyway, here is my rebuttal to your statements I hope that, if your
"rebuttal" is published, mine will be also:

-------------- begin ----------------

Mike Ossipoff is correct in claiming that Approval voting is a simple
voting method, and that it produces results that are much fairer than
plurality voting (which we now use).  However, most election-method experts
do not share Ossipoff's very high regard for the Favorite Betrayal
Criterion.

[endquote]

That's what is known as an "unsupported statement". Is Richard referring to
a poll? If so, then he needs to specify the poll. Or when he refers to
"most election-method experts", he should name at least two, and his
evidence that a majority share their view.  And, Richard, don't forget to
quote their arguments in support of their statements. Without that, it
isn't really possible for us to evaluate the validity of those statements.

Perhaps Richards wants to say that most election-method experts think it's
ok for a method to create a strategic need for favorite-burial. But, as I
said, to make that claim, he would need to name some of those experts, and
quote their arguments.

Reliance on polls (even when they are specified), or on vague references to
others' opinions, is a very weak argument, and one which strongly implies a
lack of genuine arguments.

Instead, say, "Someone named ___________ gives the following reasons in
support of my claims...."

Richard continues:

He does mention that Approval voting fails the more highly regarded
criterion called the Condorcet criteria

[endquote]

Condorcet wrote during the 18th century. The Favorite-Burial Criterion
(FBC) was first defined in the 1990s. And so Condorcet's Criterion is more
well-known than FBC.

When voters feel strategic need to bury their favorite, then public wishes
are distorted. ...grossly distorted, if the
favorite-burial is at all widespread. It's obvious that the societal
results of that can't be good. That isn't hypothetical. It's observed in
our Plurality political system.

Those who cite Condorcet's Criterion tend to forget or miss this:

If people are burying their favorites, then what does it mean, for a method
to comply with Condorcet's Criterion?
It loses its meaning.

Richard continues:

, which basically says that the winner of a Condorcet-compliant voting
method would win a runoff election against any other candidate (assuming
that voters do not change their preferences).

[endquote]

That's a colloquial wording that gives the right impression. But here's a
better wording of what Richard meant:

A definition of Condorcet's Criterion:

X "pairbeats" Y iff the number of voters ranking X over Y is greater than
the number of voters ranking Y over X.

A "Condorcet Winner" (CW) is a candidate who pairbeats all of the other
candidates.

If there is a CW, and if everyone votes sincerely, then that CW should win.

[end of definition of Condorcet's Criterion]

(I've previously posted a precise definition of sincere voting, and I'll
re-post it upon request)

And, Richard, CC is a criterion, not a "criteria".

Richard continues:

 However his preference for simplicity over fairness is not shared by a
majority of election-method experts.

[endquote]

Of course that sentence contains two unsupported opinions:

1. The opinion that fairness requires Condorcet's Criterion over FBC.
2. The opinion that a majority of election-method experts agree with
Richard about that.

Richard continues:

... In contrast, other election-method experts (who have not signed the
Declaration) do not support the use of Approval voting in any governmental
election because it could produce disappointing results that might cause
voters to reject all election-method reforms and go back to plurality
voting.

[endquote]

Again, two unsupported opinions of Richard's:

1. Approval could produce disappointing results that might cause voters to
go back to Plurality voting.

But evidently Richard doesn't want to tell us what those disappointing
results would or might be, or how Approval will make people want to go back
to Plurality.

I'm embarrassed to have to repeat this again:

If, in Plurality, you really vote for your favorite, then you will or
should approve only hir in Approval.

If, in Plurality, you instead vote for a less-liked "lesser-of-2-evils",
then, in Approval, you'd probably approve hir, and, additionally, everyone
whom you like better, including your favorite(s).

In other words, the only difference is that people are supporting
candidates whom they like more. A more liked candidate is being elected.

Richard neglected to tell us how that would make people want to go back to
Plurality.

It would be difficult to try to argue that it's bad to elect to an office
the candidate who has been approved for that
office by the most voters.

Someone could say, "But what if some approvals are _strategic?"  No, it's
still true that that winning candidate has been approved for the office by
the most voters. It isn't for us to question their motives.

Some other optimizations achieved by Approval:

A. If most people vote the way that l most recommend, then the winner will
be the candidate liked &/or trusted or regarded as deserving of support by
the most voters.

B. If voters vote according to strategy:

B1. If there are unacceptable candidates who could win, then the winner
will be the candidate who is acceptable to the most voters.

B2a. If there aren't unacceptable candidates who could win, and voters have
no predictive information or feel about winnability, then the winner will
be the candidate who is above-mean for the most voters.

B2b. If none of the above conditions obtain, then the winner will still be
the candidate who is above-expectation for the most voters.

(Actually, B2b is the general Approval strategy. All of the other Approval
strategies that I've mentioned are special cases of it. So is the familiar
"best-frontrunner-and-better" strategy suggestion. So B2b's optimization
applies whenever voters approve strategically).

B2b means that the winner will be the candidate who is, at least a little,
"too good to be true" for the most voters.

...the candidate optimistically hoped for by the most voters.

So then, Richard, which of these things will make people want to go back to
Plurality?

Richard continues:

However, using Approval voting in hotly-contested general elections would
be highly controversial.

[endquote]

Again, Richard doesn't give any support for his claim. What would be
controversial about Approval, for highly-contested elections, Richard?

Richards continues:
I am offering this as a possible rebuttal, but if someone else has a
stronger desire to write a rebuttal, I won't mind if this one is not used.

[endquote]

Used for what, where? If Richard's "rebuttal" is published, then I should
have this opportunity to thoroughly consistent use of unsupported opinions
and unreferenced quotes.

Richard continues:

I appreciate that Mike is helping to educate citizens about better voting
methods, yet it is important that bias either be avoided or pointed out.

[endquote]

It's also important that, if Richard wants to claim that my article is
biased, he should specify what statement in particular is biased, and why
he thinks so.

In fact, there's the question of what he means by "bias". And if he's using
a definition found in a dictionary, then I invite him to show that, by that
definition, my article has "bias".

But it's easier to make statements without supporting them.

One more thing: Richard, like other rank-balloting advocates, is forgetting
or missing the enactment problem of the
complicated contraptions known as rank-counts. In my article I discussed
that problem, so I won't repeat all of what I said. But the unknown results
of a complicated method, the possibility of unforseen and undesirable
results, will greatly hinder the enactability of a rank method. Opponents,
news commentators, anchor-men, and hired authorities will point out that
people don't really know how it will do. They'll say "This needs a lot more
study", and it will never happen.

This will be a problem for municipal enactment. It will fully prevent
enactment for federal offices.

By the way, Richard, tell us: Which method has more expert advocates:
Approval or VoteFair (a quasi-Kemeny), or even real Kemeny?

And how would you propose VoteFair, with its at-least-page-long definition?
 "Even though you don't understand
this [how many will even read it?], the rationale for it, or what its
consequences will be, take my word for it. It's good."

If it were undeniably one of the best, than that might even work (but
probably not). But of course it is not. There will be plenty of people
pointing out the ways in which it is suboptmal.

Mike Ossipoff
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