[EM] Comments on a few things said by Richard & Robert, May 10, '12

[Michael Ossipoff]

Richard said that my reply to his "rebuttal" wasn't credible because I
only repeated
from my article. For one thing, that isn't correct. Though in one part
of my counter-rebuttal,
I spoke of optimizations resulting from the strategies listed in my
article, I also questioned other
things that Richard had said, without repeating from my article.

Additionally, though my article listed some Approval strategies, it
_didn't_ list all of the optimizations
that I mentioned in my counter-rebuttal. So my mention of those
optimizations were not repetition from the article.

Anyway, as I've already said, when Richard claimed that Approval would
have results that would make people want
to go back to Plurality, it was called-for for me to say something
about Approval's results. That justified my
mention of those optimizations.

Richard has never supported his claims regarding Approval or my article.

As I said, vagueness, sloppiness, unaccountability and failure to
support his statements are his standard tactic.

Now, to comment on some things said by Robert. I like to be able to
say that, unlike some people, I answer all questions.
I don't want to be accused of evasion.

I'll reply to Dave Ketchum's post too. Now for Robert's post:

Robert said:

the reason that it is silly and undemocratic to elect someone who is not
the Condocet Winner is simple: if you do that, you have elected to
office a candidate when *more* of us voters marked explicitly on our
ballots that we wanted someone else.  if more of us voters agree that
Candidate A is a better choice for office than those of us who agree
that Candidate B is better, then what sense of democracy is upheld by
electing Candidate B?


[endquote]

In other words, Condorcet's Criterion is justified because failing to
comply with it would
violate Condorcet's Criterion.

Every criterion tells about some desideratum. Because the different
desiderata conflict with eachother, are
often mutually incompatible, not available with the same methods, then
we must choose which desiderata are
important to us.

I've amply spoken of the societal damage resulting from FBC failure.

Robert continues:


that's why i hold the Condorcet criterion higher than FBC

[endquote]

As I've said in a previous post, when FBC sufficiently makes is
problem, when it causes a significant
number of voters to bury their favorite, then Condorcet's Criterion
compliance becomes entirely meaningless
and valueless.

The relevance and meaning of Condorcet's Criterion depends on an
absence of the choice-distortions caused
by FBC failure.

So FBC clearly dominates and trumps Condorcet's Criterion.

As the introducer and initial proponent of Condorcet(wv), the now
predominant Condorcet family of methods, I'll
agree that Condorcet is very appealing to beginners.

But subsequent experience has shown me that it isn't good enough.

Maybe I know how Dr. Frankenstein must have felt :-)

...with Condorcet(wv) out there devastating the
voting-system-reform-advocacy countryside.

Robert continues:

do you propose to post these suggested instruction for voters at the
polls?

[endquote]

I hadn't suggested that. But it wouldn't oppose the posting of some of
my simpler
suggetions:

"Approve whomever you like and trust, or consider deserving of your support."

OR

Approve whom you'd vote for in Plurality, and everyone who is better
than him/her."

Note, Robert, that I made it clear that people needn't do other than
approving those whom
they like and trust.

Note that I said that, if _they want_ strategy, then the simple
strategy of approving whom they'd
vote for in Plurality, plus everyone better, would be sufficient.

Note that I clarified that the additional strategies that I
subsequently listed _don't_ make
Approval more complicated than Plurality. The only reason why you
don't hear such strategy suggestions
for Plurality is because no one knows them. Or, even if they were
known, they'd be too complicated to
suggest you to use.


Robert continued:

do you expect that any decent proportion of voters would go into
the booth, pull the curtain, and strategize thusly?

[endquote]

Few would, I would expect. Most would just approve those candidates whom they
like and trust, or consider deserving of their support.

But yes, some might approve the candidate they'd vote for in
Plurality, and everyone who is better.



Robert said:

perhaps these are perfectly good tactics to take into the booth in an
Approval election, but it's unreasonable to expect voters that are any
less savvy than the most sophisticated to know about, think about, and
take these tactics into the voting booth.

[endquote]

Robert, re-read what I said above, and in the strategy section of my article.


Robert continued:

*and*, as a matter of general
principle, we want to *remove* any burden of tactical voting from the
general electorate.  we want them to not have to worry about their
contingency vote acting to harm their favorite.

[endquote]

And your myth is that Condorcet can't require such strategy. I refer
you to my posts
about Condorcet's co-operation/defection problem, and its
favorite-burial incentive problem.

Mike Ossipoff
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